Integration of Social Identities in the Self: Toward a Cognitive-Developmental Model
Catherine E. Amiot, Roxane de la Sablonnière, Deborah J. Terry and Joanne R. Smith
Pers Soc Psychol Rev 2007; 11; 364
DOI: 10.1177/1088868307304091

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://psr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/11/4/364

Additional services and information for Personality and Social Psychology Review can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://psr.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts
Subscriptions: http://psr.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Citations (this article cites 139 articles hosted on the SAGE Journals Online and HighWire Press platforms):
http://psr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/11/4/364
Integration of Social Identities in the Self: Toward a Cognitive-Developmental Model

Catherine E. Amiot
Université du Québec à Montréal

Roxane de la Sablonnière
Université de Montréal

Deborah J. Terry
University of Queensland

Joanne R. Smith
University of Exeter

This article presents a model of social identity development and integration in the self. Classic intergroup theories (e.g., social identity theory, self-categorization theory) address the situational, short-term changes in social identities. Although these theories identify the contextual and environmental factors that explain situational changes in social identification, the intrapersonal processes underlying developmental changes in social identities and their integration within the self remain to be identified. Relying on recent intergroup models as well as on developmental (i.e., neo-Piagetian) and social cognitive frameworks, this article proposes a four-stage model that explains the specific processes by which multiple social identities develop intrapersonally and become integrated within the self over time. The factors that facilitate versus impede these identity change processes and the consequences associated with social identity integration are also presented.

Keywords: self; social identity; social change; intergroup relations; stress and coping

Societies and organizations around the world currently experience profound changes. Whether it is through international migration, organizational change, national deconstruction/reconstruction, or major natural disasters, social change is omnipresent in today’s world. The notion of group membership is crucial to a renegotiation of identity after a major change. For instance, as immigrants strive to adapt to their new country, they need to consider the integration of new social group memberships, reevaluate old ones, and in all likelihood, negotiate the clashes that can emerge between these differing social identities. Another example involves employees working in an organization undergoing a merger. Because mergers require employees to relinquish their premerger organizational identification and to identify with the new merged organization, this social change not only involves adopting new work procedures and developing productive relationships with members of a previously separate organization, it also means redefining an important aspect of one’s work identity. In these two examples, intrapersonal changes in social identities are occurring; that is, the configuration of individuals’ multiple social identities undergoes significant change over time (e.g., Cervone, 2005).

We adopt the position that social changes such as migration, organizational change, and political change trigger deep intrapersonal changes in social identities over time. In such contexts, changes in social identities are likely to be profound and to require the reorganization of the entire self-concept to integrate these new social identities.

Authors’ Note: This article was written while the first and second authors were supported by doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and the Fonds québécois de recherche sur la société et la culture (FQRSC). We would like to thank Matthew Hornsey, Winnifred Louis, Eliot Smith, Fabio Sani, and three anonymous reviewers for their very helpful and constructive comments. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Catherine E. Amiot, Département de psychologie, Université du Québec à Montréal, C.P. 8888, Succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal, PQ, Canada, H3C 3P8; e-mail: amiot.catherine@uqam.ca.

PSPR, Vol. 11 No. 4, November 2007 364-388
DOI: 10.1177/1088868307304091
© 2007 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
Amiot et al. / SOCIAL IDENTITY INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 365

4. Integration

Recognition and resolution of conflict between different important social identities
Interrelations are established between identities by recognizing the similarities between them
Creation of higher order categorizations to resolve the conflict
Overlap between identities, such that total outgroups or partial ingroups become total ingroups
Simultaneous identification becomes possible

A SOCIAL COGNITIVE VIEW OF THE SELF

To conceptualize how social identities develop and become integrated, it is important to illustrate first how they are organized cognitively within the self. Researchers view the self as a multifaceted cognitive structure (Markus, 1977; Markus & Wurf, 1987), that can be defined as “a collection of at least semi-related and highly domain-specific knowledge structures” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 182). Concretely, the self corresponds to the answer a person would give to the classic question “Who am I?” (Gordon, 1968). Although social identities deal specifically with group memberships, they can also be conceived as one specific type of self-component composing the global self (Deaux, 1991). Social identity can be defined as “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his or her knowledge of membership to a social group (or groups) together with the value and the emotional significance attached to it” (Tajfel, 1981a, p. 255). Because the same individual can belong to a wide variety of groups
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW

(Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), one’s overall self-concept is composed of multiple social identities.

To illustrate how the self is organized cognitively and how social identities, as specific self-components, are organized within the self, we turn to schemas. Self-schemas are defined as hierarchical knowledge structures about the self that organize and guide the processing of self-relevant information (Markus, 1977). According to self theorists, self-schemas are organized hierarchically, with more specific elements subsumed under more inclusive elements (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Marsh & Shavelson, 1985). Self-schemas are also capable of both short-term situational activation and long-term structural changes (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Smith, 1996). To account for both of these change processes, some intergroup theorists have proposed that social identities are capable of both situational, short-term changes (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; see also Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, in press), and more recurrent, developmental changes (Abrams, 1996, 1999; Abrams & Hogg, 2001; Bennett & Sani, 2004; Deaux, 1991, 1996). Drury and Reicher (2000) similarly distinguished identity change (i.e., persistent changes in self-perceptions over time) and mere variability, which they viewed as contextually determined variations among an existing repertoire of identities. In line with these views, we propose that the self provides a core structure within which social identities can change, develop, and become integrated intraindividually.

From a social cognitive point of view, the manner by which the various self-components are organized structurally within the self determines their integration (e.g., Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). When multiple identities become integrated in the self, they are organized within the global self-structure such that they can be simultaneously important to the overall self-concept. When this occurs, connections and links are established between these different self-components so that they do not feel fragmented (e.g., Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993). As a consequence, the self feels coherent rather than conflicted (see also Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). Although the differentiation of the self into distinct and unrelated self-components has been proposed to lead to positive effects on well-being (e.g., self-complexity; Linville, 1987), recent accounts of the self-structure have suggested that both differentiation of the self-components and linkages among them are needed for self-integration (Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). In line with this organizational view of the self, recent intergroup models have emphasized the importance of maintaining social identities as distinct entities while ensuring that they are simultaneously important to one’s overall sense of self (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). However, the intraindividual processes by which distinct social identities come to contribute to the overall self have yet to be identified. We now turn to classic intergroup theories and how they have explained, through the use of situational variables, the contextual variations observed in social identification.

SIT AND SCT

SIT and SCT have much to say about how social identities come to life and how the social context determines patterns of identification. Both consider the concept of social identity as being central in understanding intergroup relations and regard it as the key element linking the individual to his or her social group (Tajfel, 1981b). The main premises of these classic theories are reviewed briefly here given that they represent fundamental building blocks for the theoretical model we propose. More specifically, SIT proposes that social identity results from categorization in the social group. Categorization is a fundamental cognitive
process that allows us to organize information about the world (Rosch, 1978). Categorization of stimuli (social or not) involves the psychological accentuation of differences between categories and the attenuation of differences between elements within categories—the metacontrast principle (Turner et al., 1987). Once categorized in a social group, group members are then motivated to maintain or acquire a distinct and positive social identity for their ingroup. This can be achieved through social competition and discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Amiot & Bourhis, 2005).

SCT focuses more specifically on the cognitive processes involved in self-categorization. Although SCT recognizes that each of us belongs to a variety of social groups, the theory accounts more specifically for why individuals identify with a specific social category in one specific situation and which situational factors explain this fluctuating pattern of identification (Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987). To predict which social category one will identify with in a particular situation, SCT proposes that for a specific social identity to become salient, not only do the intergroup differences need to be greater than the intragroup differences (metacontrast principle), but the objective differences between groups must match—or fit—the expected stereotypical features of these groups (normative fit principle; Turner et al., 1987).

SCT theorists have more recently specified how they define and view the self. In line with the metacontrast principle, social identifications are viewed as being inherently comparative and as varying with the outcomes of comparison between intergroup and intragroup differences. Because SCT conceives of self-conceptions as being highly malleable, fluid, and dynamic, SCT’s view of the self is conceptually similar to Markus and Wurf’s (1987) notion of a working self-concept, according to which specific self-components are activated by the social context (Onorato & Turner, 2001). Given that an infinite number of different social identities could become salient depending on the situation, SCT sees little utility in conceiving of the self as a fixed underlying structure capable of integrating components on a longer term basis and in accounting for the processes through which social identities gain recurrent residence within the self (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; see also Onorato & Turner, 2001, 2004). Thus, this approach leaves unanswered the question of how people reflexively experience themselves: Do people experience themselves as ephemeral, transitory beings or as coherent beings over time (Condor, 1996)? Furthermore, although SIT and SCT acknowledge that each individual belongs to multiple groups, these approaches do not specify how these multiple identities change and become integrated within the self-concept over time.

**RECENT ADVANCES IN INTERGROUP THEORIES**

Building on these classic theories, more recent intergroup models have been proposed to account for further complexities in the social identification process and to illustrate how multiple social identities can be organized cognitively within the self. We present three such models in detail here: Hornsey and Hogg’s (2000a) integrative model of subgroup relations, Mummeney and Wenzel’s (1999) ingroup projection model, and Roccas and Brewer’s (2002) social identity complexity model. Although these models do not address the intraindividual changes occurring in social identities over time, they account for important structural cognitive features of social identities (i.e., how multiple social identities are organized in the self) and they recognize that social identities can be interrelated and simultaneously important to one’s self-concept (see also Abrams & Hogg, 2001; Breakwell, 1986; Deaux, 1996; Eggins, Haslam, & Reynolds, 2002). Given that these models build on Gaertner, Dovidio, Bachman, and Rust’s (1993) common ingroup identity model (CIIM), which pioneered the study of superordinate identifications (i.e., identifying with large, more inclusive groups), the CIIM is presented first.

Based on the principles of SCT, Gaertner et al. (1993) proposed a model explaining the hierarchical nature of social identities. The CIIM stresses that intergroup relations can be improved through identification with a more inclusive superordinate identity (e.g., entire nation, being a human). According to the CIIM, to reduce intergroup prejudice and discrimination, lower order subgroup identities (e.g., specific ethnicity) should be repressed and, through a process of recategorization, group members should come to identify as members of the more inclusive, higher order superordinate ingroup. A series of laboratory and field studies has supported the central hypothesis of the CIIM (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Although the CIIM primarily stresses the importance of identifying with a superordinate identity in predicting intergroup harmony, some researchers have acknowledged the possibility that group members may feel reluctant to forsake their subgroup identity in favor of the superordinate identity and that acceptance of the superordinate group will be facilitated if, at the same time, the subgroups remain relatively salient (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). In this vein, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Validzic (1998) found that this dual-identity approach was more effective at reducing intergroup bias than superordinate recategorization alone.

**Integrative Model of Subgroup Relations**

Building on Hewstone and Brown’s (1986) mutual intergroup differentiation model and on the CIIM,
Hornsey and Hogg (2000a) specified that superordinate identification will lead to positive intergroup relations only if group members perceive that their subgroup identity is recognized and respected within this superordinate category. Assigning an important role to distinctiveness threat, these authors proposed that if group members feel that their subgroup identity is neglected and threatened within the context of the superordinate social identity, this feeling of threat triggers more discrimination and prejudice on the part of subgroup members, as they strive to assert their subgroup distinctiveness within the overly inclusive superordinate group. According to this perspective, intergroup harmony is best achieved by maintaining, not weakening, subgroup identities and by locating them within the context of a binding and coherent superordinate identity (for empirical evidence, see Gonzalez & Brown, 2003; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b, 2000c).

When applied to ethnic groups in the context of immigration, Hornsey and Hogg’s (2000a) model shares similarities with a multiculturalism model, according to which original ethnic identities should be maintained and come to coexist within a superordinate identity, such as a multicultural country (see Berry, 1997, 2006). According to Hornsey and Hogg (2000a), it is when one’s original social identity is secure, rather than threatened, that identities can be integrated in the self. The crucial role played by identity threat in the context of a superordinate identification and the possibility of identifying simultaneously with both a subgroup and a superordinate category is also emphasized in our model.

**Ingroup Projection Model**

Contrary to the notion that dual identification is necessarily followed by positive consequences, the ingroup projection model adopts a more pessimistic outlook on simultaneous identification with both a subgroup and a superordinate identity and specifies the situations in which dual identification will lead to discrimination rather than enhance tolerance (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). To do so, the ingroup projection model focuses on how subgroups (e.g., countries within the European Union) actually fit together within the superordinate category. According to this model, another subgroup’s differences will be evaluated more negatively if both the ingroup and the outgroup are sufficiently included in a more abstract social category and if the ingroup’s attributes are perceived as prototypical of the inclusive category. Disagreement between the subgroups involved (e.g., countries) is thus the essence of social discrimination: If the groups disagree on which subgroup is most prototypical of the superordinate category, a differentiation of the groups is experienced as social discrimination. It is also the subgroup that is most dominant within the superordinate entity that is likely to impose its characteristics on the superordinate entity. Conversely, tolerance occurs when the superordinate category is represented in a complex manner, that is, when the superordinate category is represented not only by one set of prototypical dimensions imposed on all subgroups but rather by a diversity of dimensions.

Empirical evidence has confirmed the propositions of the model (e.g., Waldzus, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 2005; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003). For example, an experiment conducted with two groups of students (business and psychology students) revealed that the tendency to perceive one’s ingroup (e.g., psychology students) as prototypical of the superordinate category (e.g., students more generally) was more pronounced among students who identified strongly with both of these groups. Furthermore, the more one’s ingroup was perceived as being prototypical of the larger student category, the more attitudes toward the outgroup were negative (Wenzel et al., 2003, Study 1; Study 2 replicated these findings using Germans vs. Poles as subgroups within Europe). However, this projection effect can be reduced when members of the ingroup adopt a more complex representation of the superordinate category, that is, when the superordinate category allows for diversity in how it is represented. Indeed, Waldzus et al. (2003; see also Waldzus et al., 2005) showed that the positive effect of a complex representation of Europe as a superordinate category on intergroup attitudes was mediated by a decreased perception of ingroup (e.g., German) prototypicality.

Although clarifying the optimal representation of the superordinate category, Mummendey and Wenzel’s (1999) representation of a complex superordinate entity is in agreement with some of Hornsey and Hogg’s (2000a) contentions, namely, that groups included in the superordinate category need to be considered as distinct, well-recognized, and respected, and that each needs to contribute to defining the superordinate whole. In line with Hornsey and Hogg, Waldzus et al. (2005) also discussed the possible role of threat in triggering greater ingroup projection. The models presented up to now specify the structural relations among multiple social identities and, building on the CIIM, focus on multiple identities that are hierarchical to one another. Moving closer to our primary preoccupation—the cognitive integration of multiple social identities—we now turn to a model that focuses explicitly on how group members perceive their own multiple social identities (rather than others’) and how this multiplicity is represented intraindividually within the self.

**Social Identity Complexity Model**

In their social identity complexity model, Roccas and Brewer (2002) specified further how social identities are
organized structurally and how they are represented cognitively within the self. This model is based on crossed-categorization principles, according to which groups vary in the amount of overlap or embeddedness they share, with some groups being completely nested within others (e.g., the province of Québec being nested within Canada), some being mutually exclusive (e.g., being Ontarian and Québécois), and some being partially overlapped (e.g., being Francophone and Québécois). According to crossed-categorization principles, the greater the overlap or points of similarity between the groups, the more positive the evaluation of these groups will be. From the point of view of an English-speaking Canadian, double ingroups (sharing ingroup membership on both dimensions of categorization: other English-speaking Canadians) will be evaluated most positively, double outgroups (being outgroup on both dimensions: a French-speaking person from Belgium) will be evaluated least positively, and partial ingroups (sharing membership on only one of the two dimensions: French-speaking Canadians or English-speaking Australians) will be evaluated in between these two groups (e.g., Crisp & Hewstone, 1999).

Roccas and Brewer’s (2002) model presents four types of cognitive representations that can be placed on a continuum ranging from least to most complex. The first type of representation, called intersection representation, is the least complex because it reduces multiple, potentially diverse group identities to a single, highly exclusive social identity (e.g., woman researcher). This very exclusive social category means that only the conjunction of two social identities (i.e., the overlap they share) constitutes the person’s identity. The second type of identity, called dominance, involves the adoption of one primary group identification to which all other potential identities are subordinated. In this case, one social identity dominates the other identities. The third level of complexity, called compartmentalization, occurs when more than one group identity is important to an individual’s overall self-concept. When compartmentalized, separate social identities are acknowledged and differentiated, but no attempt is made to reconcile them and identities remain highly context dependent. The fourth and highest level of complexity, called merger, preserves both differentiation and integration within an inclusive social identity. When merged, non-convergent social identities are simultaneously recognized and embraced in their most inclusive form.

The intergroup models developed by Hornsey and Hogg (2000a), Mummendey and Wenzel (1999), and Roccas and Brewer (2002) recognize the multiplicity of social identities and begin to address how these hierarchical and crosscutting identities are organized intrindividually within the self. Although these organizational features of social identities form an important basis of the model we propose, these models propose a rather static, snapshot account of how multiple social identities are represented cognitively in the self, and they do not explain how these cognitive configurations change over time. The dynamic intrindividual processes involved when social identities develop, and that account for the stages through which multiple social identities become integrated within the self and become important to one’s sense of self over time, have yet to be proposed. We believe that a better understanding of these phenomena can be gained from theorizing and research conducted in the realm of developmental psychology. Drawing on both a social identity perspective and developmental models, we outline a four-stage model of social identity development and integration in the self. These processes are hypothesized to apply to identities that are both hierarchical and crosscutting. We also discuss the antecedent factors that may inhibit versus facilitate these developmental processes and the consequences associated with identity integration. But first, we turn to a general overview of the developmental perspective with regard to the development of identity over time.

DEVELOPMENTAL AND INTEGRATION PROCESSES

The complementarities between social and developmental perspectives on the self have recently been emphasized. According to Bennett and Sani (2004), developmental models can complement intergroup theories in explaining the development of social identities. In fact, although the development of the self has not been studied thoroughly from a social psychological point of view, this topic constitutes an important focus in the developmental literature (e.g., Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Harter, 2003). Indeed, transitions and important life changes have been recognized by developmental theorists to be particularly sensitive periods, which systematically influence changes in self-construals and require the self-system to reorganize (e.g., Harter, 1999). Developmental models thus confirm the need to investigate intradividual changes in social identities in these changing contexts (Rubel et al., 2004; see also Helms, 1990). Phinney (1993; Phinney & Rosenthal, 1992) recognized the potential for conflicts to emerge among different social identities in such contexts and the need to explain how these conflicts are worked out and how different identities become integrated in the self.

To account for the processes and the stages by which multiple social identities develop and become integrated over time, we rely on a neo-Piagetian developmental approach. We consider this approach as being appropriate given that it complements the social cognitive
view of how the self is structured. For example, this approach considers how the self is composed of multiple, hierarchical, and interrelated subcomponents. In addition, the neo-Piagetian approach accounts for the intraindividual developmental changes occurring in the self over time. In fact, neo-Piagetian theorists propose that general cognitive development plays a central role in determining the emergence, form, and increasing differentiation of self-conceptions (e.g., Bennett & Sani, 2004); increased cognitive capacities thus influence how the structure of the self changes and develops (e.g., Harter, 1999, 2003; Mascolo & Fischer, 1998; Mascolo, Fisher, & Neimeyer, 1999).

When assessing the development of the self-concept over time, the developmental approach explains how children integrate multiple dimensions of identity from childhood to adulthood. For instance, Harter (1999, 2003) described how impossible it is for 2- to 4-year-olds to think of themselves as having more than one identity salient at a time. According to neo-Piagetians, this developmental stage operates under an all-or-none cognitive mode. Leonard, a 3-year-old, could, for example, conceive of himself only as being kind. As Leonard grows up, however, new identities are created and conceivable in the different contexts he encounters. Whereas around middle childhood (i.e., 5 to 7 years old) some specific aspects of identity are most salient and predominate the self, at early adolescence, the diversity of the different identities previously acquired becomes acknowledged more directly as the specific developmental task at this stage is to construct multiple self-abstractions that vary coherently across roles and relationships (Harter, 1999). Around 11 years old, Leonard is cognitively able to switch from one identity to another depending on the social context. Leonard thinks of himself as kind and affectionate when with his friends and his little brother, and unkind and even a bit tough with his more aggressive cousin. During adolescence, further links among identities are created, and Leonard is now able to create more cognitive abstractions that can integrate these conflicting identities into his self. For instance, to resolve a contradiction between being affectionate with friends and being rough with unkind people, Leonard could consider himself as being assertive. As another example, to resolve the fact that he is intelligent in class and an airhead when doing house chores, he could label himself as being pensive or introspective. Doing so would allow him to consider himself as characterized by the different self-attributes, even if these can be perceived as opposing each other.

In more specific terms, the neo-Piagetian approach proposes that as the self develops, it moves from fractionation and differentiation of its different components toward their increased integration—the self develops by becoming increasingly complex (Bidell & Fischer, 1996; Fischer, 1980; Harter, 1999, 2003; Mascolo & Fischer, 1998; Yan & Fischer, 2002). With development, self-representations thus involve an increasing number of self-dimensions that are better integrated into an increasingly complex self-system (e.g., Demetriou, Kazi, & Georgiou, 1999). It is through the establishment of cognitive associations that various self-components (such as specific social identities) become coordinated within the self. Furthermore, higher order superordinate self-abstractions are created to integrate these different self-components and resolve the contradictions among them (Mascolo & Fischer, 1998). In this respect, the neo-Piagetian perspective concurs with a social cognitive view of the self as a structure capable of differentiation of its subcomponents yet as striving toward the coherent integration of this diversity (e.g., Donahue et al., 1993; Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). The two key cognitive aspects of this integration process lie in the capacity to (a) establish interconnections (i.e., cognitive links) among different self-components (social identities) and (b) create meaningful higher order self-representations (or superordinate identifications), which bind the different self-components.

Applying these developmental principles to social identities specifically, we propose that the first identity integration process—the establishment of interconnections between different social identities—could operate through a process similar to a gradual increase in cognitive overlap between social identities that were either completely distinct (total outgroups) or overlapping only to a small degree (partial ingroups). The crossed-categorization literature has identified different situational factors (e.g., use of inclusive vs. exclusive language, induction of positive mood) that produce a momentary shift from perceiving a total outgroup as a partial ingroup (or vice versa; Crisp & Hewstone, 1999). We propose that such shifts could also operate intraindividually and on a more recurrent basis to explain why we gradually come to identify with a new social group and increase the perceived overlap between our past social identities and the new social group. This first identity integration process is thus more likely to apply to old and new identities that crosscut and vary in the overlap they share.

In line with crossed-categorization principles, the actual degree of overlap existing between one’s current social identities and the new identity could also determine the extent to which this new identity will be easy to integrate. If the overlap is nonexistent or very small, and if the new group member has nothing to relate to within his or her new social group, it will be harder to establish cognitive links and connections between identities (e.g., an English-speaking Canadian moving to China). However, a greater degree of overlap between one’s pre-existing identities and the new identity (e.g., an English-speaking Australian moving to the United States or United Kingdom) will facilitate the integration
process. Similarly, based on subtyping principles (e.g., Richards & Hewstone, 2001), identification with a new social identity could take place by first identifying with a specific subgroup within one’s new social group. For instance, the accountant immigrating to Australia will identify with groups that provide him with some continuity, such as his professional group—other accountants in Australia—on arrival. With time, and as this newcomer joins various other subgroups within Australia (e.g., swimming squad, political organization), this identification could spread and generalize to become increasingly inclusive (identifying more broadly as an Australian).

The second integration process involves the creation of meaningful superordinate identities that bind one’s various subgroup identities. This process has its roots in both Hornsey and Hogg’s (2000a) and Mummendey and Wenzel’s (1999) models, which stress the importance of binding and complex superordinate identities. In line with developmental principles and to the extent that the new group identity to be integrated can be nested within a superordinate identity, differences and conflicts between old and new identities could be resolved by identifying with abstract and inclusive social identities that also subsume one’s different subgroup memberships. Altogether, this second integration process is more likely to apply to identities that are superordinate to one another.

AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF SOCIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION

Relying on these basic developmental principles and building on each of the intergroup models presented, we propose a four-stage model of social identity development and integration. Within this model, four main stages of social identity development are proposed: anticipatory categorization, categorization, compartmentalization, and integration (see Table 1). These stages are derived from the neo-Piagetian developmental approach, which proposes that the process of development leads to an increased acknowledgment of multiple identities over time and to their integration in the self. Thus, for each of these stages, we draw parallels with the neo-Piagetian evidence, describe the change processes underpinning these stages, and discuss supporting empirical evidence. Before presenting these stages, we present two important considerations of the model.

A first consideration points to the fact that although the neo-Piagetian processes were originally proposed to explain the developmental changes occurring from childhood to early adulthood, these processes are believed to apply equally well to adults (provided that the cognitive resources necessary to work through the stages are available to them; Mascolo & Fischer, 1998). In times of changes (such as those presented in Figure 1), the need to integrate new and potentially conflicting social identities can trigger the proposed developmental processes in a recursive fashion regardless of one’s specific age (see Phinney, 1996, 2003, 2006; Yan & Fischer, 2002). However, though neo-Piagetians have relied primarily on increased cognitive capacities as the drivers underlying self-development, these abilities are likely to have stabilized by early adulthood. In fact, Labouvie-Vief, Chiodo, Gogonen, Diehl, and Orwoll (1995) have shown that whereas earlier self-development is more likely to be regulated by normative cognitive-developmental regularities, later self-development is more responsive to sociocultural, motivational, and affective factors (see also Flavell, 1970). Furthermore, self-reorganization and integration of novel elements within the self can require high levels of energy, effort, and commitment. Important life changes, which call for the integration of new identities, can be demanding and require the use of effortless coping strategies. For instance, the motivation and keenness manifested by new group members who strive for acceptance within their new social group are an important factor in the process of both acculturation (Berry, 1997; Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002; Richmond, 1993) and newcomer socialization (Chen & Klimoski, 2003; Moreland, 1985).

Thus, apart from the cognitive processes guiding the general development of the self proposed by neo-Piagetians, we postulate that some specific antecedents will influence the extent to which individuals will move from one developmental stage to another by either propelling them through the sequence of identity change or inhibiting the progression through these stages. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the overall model we propose and how these facilitating and inhibiting factors act as antecedents to the four-stage developmental sequence. These antecedents—which have been shown to apply throughout the entire life span—include emotional reactions, coping efforts, and social factors such as social support and characteristics of the intergroup structure. These factors are compatible with developmental writings that have stressed the importance of emotions (e.g., Lewis, 2002); effort, agency, and goal-directed action (e.g., Brandstädter, 1998; Higgins, 1991; Mascolo et al., 1999); and social and cultural contexts (e.g., Demetriou, 2000; Phinney, 2003; Timotijevic & Breakwell, 2000; Vygotsky, 1978) in the development of the self. We come back to these inhibiting and facilitating factors after presenting the cognitive processes and stages involved when social identities develop and become integrated in the self.

A second consideration of the model is that it focuses on explaining the processes involved as group members acquire novel social identities within their self-concept—that is, how the self expands. However, the process by which we come to relinquish or let go of some identities
that are already in place within the self also merits consideration (e.g., Deaux, 1991, 1996; Sussman, 2000). The mechanisms underlying these changes could be explained through similar social cognitive processes that are used to explain their integration. In fact, identity disintegration could occur through consistent deactivation (either motivated or not) of social identities and the removal of links between these identities and those that are more consistently activated (see Smith, 1996). For example, citizens of ex-U.S.S.R. countries (e.g., Kyrgyzstan) need to revise their identification to the Soviet Union as a superordinate entity. Furthermore, our model does not aim to address more subtle fluctuations in the importance or relevance of specific identities over time, such as when an already-acquired social identity gains or loses importance relative to other identities depending on situational or environmental factors. We turn now to the specific developmental phases of our model.

A Four-Stage Model of Social Identity Development and Integration in the Self

Anticipatory categorization. The first stage represents an anticipatory phase that initiates the process of identity integration. Being anticipatory, this stage takes place before a change in one’s life is actually encountered and before being in actual contact with a new social group. In the case of unexpected changes, such as invasions or coups, this anticipatory stage would not be experienced. Nevertheless, many life changes are foreseen, which trigger planning and anticipatory behaviors. Given individuals’ tendency to plan ahead and engage in some form of proactive actions (e.g., Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; Bidell & Fischer, 1994), the integration of a new identity could start as soon as one foresees a change. For instance, in a study conducted among new fathers, participants already identified to a certain degree with the parent role during their partner’s pregnancy (Strauss & Goldberg, 1999). Constructs such as future selves (e.g., Cantor, Norem, Niedenthal, Langston, & Brower, 1987) also propel us into the future and guide behaviors that will shape the development of new identities (Cross & Markus, 1991).

We propose that at the anticipatory categorization stage, the cognitive process of self-anchoring is operating. Self-anchoring is a heuristic process whereby self-characteristics and attributes are projected onto novel ingroups. This process gives meaning to one’s new group membership and results in a feeling of unity with this ingroup (Otten & Wentura, 2001). Empirically, self-anchoring has been found to be stronger than intergroup differentiation, through which group members attempt to distinguish their ingroup from the outgroup (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; R. W. Clement & Krueger, 2002; Otten & Bar-Tal, 2002; Otten & Wentura, 2001). Using reaction times as a measure of people’s identification with one of their current ingroups, Smith and colleagues (Coats, Smith, Claypool, & Banner, 2000; Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999; Smith & Henry, 1996) similarly found that group membership involves some sort of merging of self and the ingroup rather than triggering a distinction between self and outgroup (see also Brewer, 2001, for a discussion of ingroup attachment vs. outgroup differentiation). A recent meta-analysis conducted on these projection processes concluded that self-anchoring is more observable in minimal groups—the epitome of novel groups (Otten & Bar-Tal, 2002)—than among real-life groups (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). This is understandable because in such a minimal, Kafkaesque situation, the scarcity of information about one’s new group leads participants to rely heavily on self-knowledge as one of the only sources of information available. Furthermore, self-anchoring might operate particularly strongly in contexts where groups are not yet defined by a specific and definite prototype (e.g., Otten & Epstude, 2006) or when one’s conception of a new social identity is not based on concrete experiences of contact with the new group, which is what occurs at the anticipatory categorization phase. However, when actual contact with members of the new group takes place and individuals learn more about the characteristics of this group, the self-anchoring effect should dissipate and be replaced by more intergroup-based dynamics (e.g., motivation for group distinctiveness; intergroup competition and conflict; see also R. W. Clement & Krueger, 2002; Otten & Epstude, 2006).

To illustrate the anticipatory categorization stage, consider the example of a 25-year-old Russian immigrant who is planning to immigrate to Canada. When she arrives, she will be confronted with the need to integrate different cultural identities. However, even before immigrating and in the absence of much information about Canada, she might ask herself some important questions with regard to what her new group membership will involve and speculate as to which of her individual characteristics could also apply to being a Canadian. For example, through the self-anchoring process, she could think that being a tolerant person herself, all Canadians are helpful and open to immigrants.

Similarly, consider the case of an employee from an organization undergoing an intergroup merger. Our anticipatory categorization stage has parallels with Seo and Hill’s (2005) premerger stage, which takes place when top managers discuss the possibility of a merger and rumors spread among employees about the merger but the premerger organizations are still separate and stable. Research indicates that employees at this stage are attuned to seeing some form of continuity and overlap between the premerger and postmerger identities. In fact, a study conducted at the premerger phase showed that the degree of premerger organizational identification was a strong
predictor of employees’ identification with the expected merged organization (Bartels, Douwes, de Jong, & Pruyn, 2006). In contrast, intergroup dynamics and issues surrounding the survival of the premerger identity within the new merged organizational entity are likely to be weak at this phase (Seo & Hill, 2005).

Categorization. The second stage of our model is categorization. At this stage, group members are confronted with an actual change in their lives and with the existence of a new social group. This stage is marked by issues of intergroup distinctiveness. Intergroup dynamics are likely to emerge as differences between the groups become concrete and salient. In line with the premises of SIT, the categorization process and the increased salience of the ingroup–outgroup context can be considered as an important developmental stage leading to the formation of new social identities (see Ruble et al., 2004, for a review). At this stage, distinct social identities are recognized, and differences (in terms of values, norms) among social identities become highly salient, which reinforces the person’s own social characteristics and his or her sense of belonging to the original social group. The group distinctiveness motive proposed by SIT also enhances this tendency to view groups as being distinct and to affirm one’s current group membership (e.g., Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004). Because the features of the different groups involved are highly differentiated, the individual does not consider the possibility of being part of these multiple groups (i.e., the characteristics of that new group cannot yet be conceived as elements of one’s own self).

From a neo-Piagetian point of view, this categorization stage would take place when self-components that were previously completely isolated are perceived as being opposed to one another (Fischer, 1980). Thus, self-components at this stage are explicitly recognized as being different. Because the self-components are of an all-or-none nature, only a specific set of attributes are seen as representing the self (Case, 1992; Harter, 2003). In the context of social identities, the self-components that apply to the self are those characterizing one’s original ingroup. In this context, a specific and distinct social identity thus predominates one’s entire self. Although at this stage distinctions among different and opposing social identities are recognized, these distinct identities cannot yet represent the self (Harter, 1999; Helms, 1990; see also Phinney, 1993, for evidence with regard to children’s ethnic identities).

Going back to the Russian immigrant example, at the categorization stage, her immersion in the new Canadian context provides a direct test of her assumptions (developed at the anticipatory categorization stage) about what it means to be Canadian and may cause her to reconsider some of them. The actual contact with her new group also allows her to appreciate the distinctiveness of the Canadian and Russian identities and to position herself in this new environment (see Sussman, 2000). Because the differences between the two cultures are more striking to her at this point, this minority status could reinforce her identification as a Russian and make this identity even more salient than when she was in Russia (e.g., Benet-Martinez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002; Kosmitzki, 1996). Indeed, cross-cultural contact in the early stages of intercultural contact enables newcomers to isolate the ethnic characteristics typical of their ingroup as they discover and acknowledge who they are in the face of the other culture (Stosolska & Yi, 2003). Similarly, Sussman (2000) reported that one of the first processes involved in cultural transitions is identity salience where “outgroup membership appears to strengthen, at least initially, our identification with our home culture” (p. 363). Given the all-or-none identification processes operating in this categorization stage, the Russian immigrant is likely to feel that she is Russian and not Canadian at all. Cognitively, this stage would involve denying one element while bolstering the other (see Tadmor & Tedlock, 2006), and in acculturation terms, this would be analogous to adopting a separation orientation, where the individual identifies predominantly with his or her original culture (Berry, 1997).

At this point in the identity-integration process, no intraindividual conflict between identities (being Canadian vs. Russian) emerges because the Canadian identity is clearly not part of her self—she does not yet imagine herself possessing features of both of these groups, and the new identity to be integrated is still external to her sense of self. In crossed-categorization terms, she would thus perceive herself as a member of an outgroup distinct from Canadians. Furthermore, her lack of knowledge and experience in her new culture prevents her from finding similarities and drawing connections between the Russian and the Canadian cultures. With respect to the superordinate identification process, identification with a superordinate identity (e.g., a multicultural Canadian identity; see Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a) is not possible at this stage because the Russian immigrant does not yet know if this superordinate identity can truly bind the different identities.

Turning back to the merger example, the categorization stage corresponds temporally to Seo and Hill’s (2005) formal combination stage, which takes place when the new merged organization is created and when concrete plans are made for this new organization (e.g., goals, vision, common decisions). At this stage of the merging process, the employee’s premerger organizational identity is likely to be the most dominant and relevant identity, especially in a context where issues of identity loss become increasingly salient. In line with
Seo and Hill’s (2005) merger model, the threatening and stressful aspects of the merger (Terry, Carey, & Callan, 2001; Terry & O’Brien, 2001), elicited by the instability it brings to both employees’ work conditions and social benefits, and the risk it poses to the survival of the premerger organizational identity (van Dick, Ullrich, & Tissington, 2006; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, Monden, & de Lima, 2002), are predominant at this categorization stage (see also Fugate, Kinicki, & Sheck, 2002). With respect to changes in identity per se, a longitudinal study (in which a first survey was completed a few months before the merger and the second survey was completed after the first waves of change had been implemented) revealed a decrease in employees’ degree of identification with the new merged organization over time and in their perceptions that the merged organization constituted one common group (Terry, 2003). These findings suggest that the concrete implementation of the merger (i.e., at the categorization stage) might lead employees to revisit (and disidentify somewhat with) the preconceived social identity they had developed at the anticipatory categorization stage.

From the point of view of the subgroup relations model (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a), identifying predominately with one’s subgroup corresponds to the categorization stage. At this stage, simultaneous identification with both superordinate and subgroup identities is not possible given the all-or-none processes that are operating. Roccas and Brewer’s (2002) dominance representation (i.e., their second representation type) also shares conceptual similarities with the categorization stage given that it involves the preponderance of one social identity eclipsing all the others and predominating one’s overall self. Nevertheless, this first step toward identity integration is crucial: It allows the individual to recognize cognitively the distinct social identities present in one’s social environment and to position himself or herself in the predominant pre-existing social identities. Although a developmental task at this stage is to deal with the novelty and uncertainty brought about by the changing situation, doing so allows the individual to derive order from the situation and to become more aware of the characteristics pertaining to the different social identities involved.

Compartmentalization. The third stage proposed to account for the development of social identities is compartmentalization. At this stage, the multiplicity of one’s old and new social identities becomes recognized more explicitly as one comes to identify with different social groups and realize that he or she belongs to these various groups. This occurs as group members have increased contact with members of other groups and as different social identities are activated simultaneously. These experiences lead to the establishment of further interconnections and cognitive links among these different self-components. However, given that at this stage these multiple social identities are kept compartmentalized and distinct within the person’s self, the possible intraindividual contradictions between the identities are not yet recognized (Harter, 1999; Harter & Monsour, 1992; Higgins, 1991). Although one can now consider oneself as being a member of different social groups, the identities remain highly context dependent, and simultaneous identification is not yet possible.

In fact, because of the connections established among different self-components at this stage, the self-components can now become part of the self rather than being seen as oppositional and totally external to the person’s self (Harter, 2003). With this cognitive capacity to integrate distinct self-components, the person becomes much less likely to engage in all-or-none thinking, and self-descriptions begin to represent a more balanced presentation of one’s diverse self-components. Still, at this stage, the self-components are highly context dependent and are kept compartmentalized (Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980; Harter, 1999; Higgins, 1991; Pinney, 1993; Pinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997). According to Fischer (1980), the self-components are overdifferentiated because the person lacks cognitive control over such self-representations and therefore can think about them only in terms of distinct self-attributes. However, the inability to integrate seemingly contradictory characteristics has the psychological advantage of sparing one from conflicts over opposing abstract self-attributes (Harter & Monsour, 1992) or the difficulties associated with reconciling the demands of multiple, potentially incompatible personal and social identities (e.g., Baumeister, 1986). Thus, increased differentiation serves as a buffer, which reduces the possibility that negative attributes of one self-abstraction spread to another abstraction (e.g., Linville, 1987).

For instance, with increased experience and knowledge gathered in the new Canadian context, the Russian immigrant could come to increasingly identify herself with some aspects of the Canadian culture and some specific subgroups within the Canadian context. As the uncertainty and novelty of the arrival in Canada fades and as she develops social relationships with other Canadians and members of other groups, the new Canadian identity should start to take form and gradually become part of her self-concept (e.g., Stosolska & Yi, 2003). Crossed-categorization principles could come into operation, such as if the new Russian immigrant joins a group of Russians who also immigrated to Canada. Indeed, research has supported this initial tendency to associate with conationals (see Cross, 1995, for evidence among international university students). Eventually, identifying with this partial ingroup could lead her to identify with Canadians.
more generally, for instance, if through this group membership and those contacts she also meets some non-Russian Canadians (see also Ataca & Berry, 2002).

Furthermore, if elements of her social identities in the Russian context share similarities or overlap with some of the groups that she newly joined in Canada (e.g., similar job, being part of skiing clubs in both countries), such group memberships allow her to find overlap between elements of her previous cultural identity and her new one. With respect to superordinate identification processes, increased experience in a new culture could also allow her to see the benefits of adding this new social identity to her sense of self (e.g., increased cohesion with other Canadians, openness to new values and customs). However, at the compartmentalization stage, the Canadian identity is not yet completely part of the self; she still feels distinctively Russian in certain situations (e.g., when interacting with her family members) but increasingly Canadian in other contexts (e.g., when interacting with colleagues at work). The identities are therefore highly contextualized and distinct and likely to be associated with distinct thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors. Benet-Martinez et al. (2002) reported evidence for these situational shifts in identity, such that Chinese American biculturals responded in culturally coherent ways to situational cues and shifted their behavior as a function of the cultural context (see also Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000).

Similarly, for the employee undergoing the merger, increased experience in the superordinate new merged organization after the merger has been implemented will provide a basis for him or her to identify with the new organization (e.g., Terry, 2003). This is likely to take place at the operational combination stage proposed by Seo and Hill (2005), during which interactions between members of both premerger organizations are extended from top management to general work units, and employees are pushed to learn new ways of doing things and to adopt new value and belief systems. Because of the instability of the merging situation at this stage (i.e., common procedures and ways of conducting business are still being implemented, relationships are in the process of being built between members of the two premerger organizations) and because the distinctions and discontinuities between the premerger and postmerger organizations are not yet completely worked out (Buono & Bowditch, 1989), the discrepancies between his organizational identities are likely to still be salient at this stage. Thus, the employee’s identifications with his or her premerger organization and with the newly merged organization are likely to be distinct and unrelated (for empirical evidence, see Boen, Vanbeselaere, Hollants, & Feys, 2005) or weakly related at best (e.g., Terry & O’Brien, 2001; van Dick, Wagner, & Lemmer, 2004; cf. van Knippenberg et al., 2002). To bridge this gap, merger researchers have proposed that crossed-categorization processes could prove useful. For instance, by developing informal ties with a group of employees that originate from both one’s premerger organization and the other premerger organization, employees in a merger may be more prone to establish links between the two premerger organizations and develop a sense of identification with the overall new merged entity (see Seo & Hill, 2005).

Roccas and Brewer’s (2002) compartmentalization representation is conceptually similar to our compartmentalization stage given that it allows multiple identities to be important to one’s self. More specifically, in our model, the compartmentalization phase acknowledges the multiplicity of one’s social identities, and the capacity of the changing social context to expand the self so that it becomes increasingly complex. Yet, when compartmentalized, different social identities are kept separate and isolated and are context dependent. The next stage is crucial in terms of integration in that it involves the realization that intraindividual conflict between social identities can exist and that supplementary resources must be deployed to work these conflicts out, so as to truly integrate different social identities in the self.

Integration. The fourth stage is integration. At this stage, individuals come to recognize that multiple and distinct social identities are simultaneously important to their self. From a neo-Piagetian point of view, the integration stage is based on the developmental processes occurring in middle and late adolescence. Developmentalists have proposed that adolescence marks a time of considerable activity in terms of self-development (e.g., Harter, 1999). During this stage, characterized by an increasing differentiation of self-attributes, the task is to consolidate the multiple self-components to construct an integrated and coherent identity (Phinney, 1993). The result of this phase is the recognition that the different components constituting one’s self are no longer context dependent and that multiple social identities can contribute to the overall self-concept in a distinct and positive manner.

Neo-Piagetians have proposed that to achieve this result, one must first recognize that different self-attributes can conflict within the self and that further cognitive and motivational resources must be deployed to resolve these contradictions (Harter, 1999; Harter & Monsour, 1992; Mascolo et al., 1999). This lack of internal self-coherence and the awareness of one’s conflicting self-components within the global self produce instability in the self-portrait as well as the potential for intrapsychic conflict and distress (Harter & Monsour, 1992; Higgins, 1991). This occurs, for instance, as adolescents become aware that different significant others may hold different opinions...
about themselves (Harter, 1999) or as they realize that the abstract characteristics of their identities (e.g., values, beliefs, traditions) are not as context specific as assumed previously (see Phinney, 1993).

To resolve these intraindividual conflicts, cognitive links are formed between the different social identities so that similarities between them are acknowledged. Higher order and more inclusive self-abstractions are also formed cognitively to connect distinct self-components, to bind the previously conflicting identities, and to bring meaning and legitimacy to what formerly appeared to be contradictions in the self (Harter, 1999, 2003; Mascolo et al., 1999). These advances provide the person with new cognitive solutions for developing a more integrated self (Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980). Harter and Monsour (1992) provided support for these processes by showing that older adolescents integrate self-inconsistencies by asserting that it is in fact normal to display different attributes across different contexts and that diversified self-components contribute positively to their global self.

Similarly, these processes of recognition of conflict between attributes and the use of binding attributes to resolve this conflict have been recognized in the social cognition and identity management literatures (e.g., Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990; see Hutter & Crisp, 2005). For example, the inconsistency arising from the combination of attributes or characteristics from different categories that, when put together become incongruent (e.g., an Harvard-educated carpenter), can be resolved by creating what is called emergent attributes—that is, attributes that were not inherently present in the original social categories and that bind the clashing attributes (e.g., thinking of a Harvard-educated carpenter as skilled yet nonmaterialistic and disillusioned by a culture of competition). This process is congruent with those proposed by neo-Piagetians and could be operating when resolving conflicts between clashing attributes originating from old versus new social identifications.

Going back to one of our examples, as the Russian Canadian interacts in her new culture and the two identities become simultaneously important to her, she may become more aware of the discrepancies between her Canadian and Russian identities and the basis for clashes between them. Gil, Vega, and Dimas (1994) provided support for the fact that biculturals can experience conflict during the acculturation process (see also Leong & Ward, 2000). It has been suggested that this stress stems from the challenge of integrating different sets of cultural demands (see also Tadmor & Tetlock, 2006). Walsh, Shulman, Feldman, and Maurer (2005) further showed that young adult immigrants report a lower sense of self-coherence and unity than nonimmigrant young adults.

Given the unease associated with such intraindividual conflict and the need to develop a differentiated yet coherent sense of self (Harter, 1999, 2003; Mascolo et al., 1999), the Russian Canadian will rely on certain cognitive strategies to resolve this conflict. The reduction of intraindividual conflict could take place through two solutions. First, though realizing the many ways her two identities are distinct, she may come to find similarities and consistencies among these identities, as well as realize that each social identity contributes positively and in a unique way to her self-concept. Phinney and Devich-Navarro (1997), for example, revealed that bicultural adolescents (i.e., Mexican Americans and African Americans) who integrated both cultures in their sense of self felt that this allowed them to be a more complete and well-rounded person and that benefits could be derived from bringing these cultures together (see also Anderson, 1994).

Using these cognitive strategies could result in the adoption of the integration acculturation orientation (Berry, 1997), which involves adopting a new cultural identity while maintaining one’s own cultural heritage. This stage could also be conceptualized as what Lafromboise, Coleman, and Gerton (1993) described as cultural competence, where individuals develop the ability to be competent in two cultures without losing their cultural identity or having to choose one identity over another (see also Padilla & Perez, 2003). Benet-Martinez and colleagues (2002; Benet-Martinez & Haritatos, 2005) similarly defined bicultural identity integration as the degree to which biculturals perceive their mainstream and ethnic identities as compatible rather than oppositional and difficult to integrate. These authors found positive associations between bicultural identity integration and length of time spent in one’s new country (see also Phinney, 2003).

As a second solution, and to the extent that the Russian immigrant perceives that the Canadian society allows for the coexistence of different cultures, conflicts between identities could be resolved by considering her Canadian identity as a superordinate category, which includes the Russian community living in Canada and allows the coexistence of her different identities. However, and in line with Hornsey and Hogg’s (2000a) and Mummendey and Wenzel’s (1999) models, this is likely to take place only if she feels that her Russian identity can coexist with her Canadian identity (rather than her Russian identity becoming assimilated within the Canadian one) and if the superordinate Canadian identity allows for some complexity and diversity in how it is construed (rather than having long-time Canadians of European descent define which attributes should be prototypical of all Canadians). Once these conditions are met, we could expect the Canadian with a Russian background to conceive of herself...
as a total Canadian ingroup member. Another superordinate identity that could apply in the context of immigration pertains to the human category (i.e., identifying with the superordinate group of humans; see Wohl & Branscombe, 2005, for empirical evidence). Sussman (2000) also proposed that the reconciliation of identity conflicts could occur by identifying as a citizen of the world as another form of superordinate identity.

Similarly, for the employee experiencing an organizational merger, tensions and conflicts between the premerger organizations are to be assumed (Pepper & Larson, 2006), especially as employees experience differences between the premerger organizational cultures in their daily operations (Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Seo & Hill, 2005). These conflicts could be resolved through identifying simultaneously with the premerger organization and the newly merged superordinate organization (e.g., Pratt & Foreman, 2000; van Knippenberg et al., 2002). Furthermore, in the merger context, a process of transformation analogous to the emergent attributes phenomenon (Hutter & Crisp, 2005) has been proposed, whereby the new merged organization is completely new and has no links to the premerger organizations (Giessner, Viki, Otten, Terry, & Tauber, 2006; Schoennauer, 1967). In actuality, it is logistically difficult for organizations to absolutely disconnect this new merged entity from the characteristics of each premerger organization (Millward & Kyriakidou, 2004). Although some aspects of transformation have been found to be beneficial in mergers (e.g., choosing a completely new name or logo for the new merged organization rather than adopting those of the dominant premerger organization; Rosson & Brooks, 2004), the new merged organization should keep some of the defining positive premerger features. Doing so allows employees to maintain a sense of continuity with the past and to build on enduring organizational strengths (e.g., van Knippenberg et al., 2002). The result of the merging process is referred to as the stabilization stage, which takes place when organizational stability recurs and norms, roles, and organizational routines are stabilized. However, it may take years before this stage is reached and the new organizational identity is integrated fully (Seo & Hill, 2005).

Although integration of old and new identities occurs when connections and links are established between these different self-components such that the self feels coherent rather than fragmented and conflicted, we differentiate between two forms of identity integration: (a) an intersection form labeled restrictive integration and (b) a more inclusive form labeled additive integration (see also Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Although both forms engender a subjective feeling of intraindividual coherence, only one has positive consequences for intergroup relations. The first, restrictive form of integration results in links and an overlap between the new and old social identities, but this overlap is restricted to the portion shared by these identities rather than encompassing the entirety of the different groups (see Roccas & Brewer, 2002, for a thorough discussion of such intersecting identities). In this case, ingroup members are considered to be those falling in the intersection (i.e., only those who are members of both groups; see also Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1998). This restrictive form of integration most likely leads to a form of segregation (e.g., identifying only with other Russian immigrants living in Canada) and to more overall ingroup bias, given that many group members do not fall into the conjunction of these two identities (i.e., those who are Canadian but not Russian and those who are Russian but not living in Canada would be outgroup members). The second, additive form of integration involves a broader and more inclusive conception of one’s group memberships (e.g., being a Canadian with a Russian background). Because this form of integration encompasses people who are either members of one’s old social group (Russian) or members of the new group (Canadian), it should lead to less bias (see Brewer & Pierce, 2005, and Roccas & Brewer, 2002, for empirical evidence).

In line with neo-Piagetian principles, the present model argues that the self moves from fragmentation and differentiation of its different self-components (i.e., social identities) toward an increased integration of this diversity. Similarly, from a social cognitive point of view, an integrated self-structure allows for both the differentiation of its various self-elements and the finding of interrelations among them (e.g., Donahue et al., 1993; Rafaeli-Mor, & Steinberg, 2002). Thus, integration of multiple social identities in the self could come about by ensuring that these various identities contribute positively and in a complementary manner to one’s overall self and that conflicts among these identities are resolved through establishing links among them, by increasing their shared overlap, and by identifying with a binding, superordinate identity.

ANTECEDENTS OF IDENTITY INTEGRATION

To put the proposed developmental sequence in context, and as illustrated in Figure 1, we identify some antecedents that could either facilitate or inhibit the cognitive processes through which social identity develops and becomes integrated in the self. Although identifying simultaneously with different social groups has been argued to be desirable (e.g., Benet-Martinez et al., 2002; Berry, 1997, 2006; Lafromboise et al., 1993), some factors will influence the extent to which social identities can become integrated. Not all individuals benefit from environments that support the integration of different identities; some social environments may actually inhibit such an integration and impede the enactment of
one’s different social identities. Moreover, the integration task is effortful (e.g., Chen & Klimoski, 2003) and requires the use of active coping and adaptation strategies. In this section, we outline antecedent factors that should either inhibit (i.e., feelings of threat, status, and power asymmetries) or facilitate (i.e., social support, coping efforts) the progression through the proposed four-stage developmental sequence.

Inhibitors of Social Identity Integration

Feelings of threat. Important social changes, which have the potential to trigger changes in social identities, can also be considered as a source of threat for group members (Breakwell, 1986; Ethier & Deaux, 1994). These feelings in turn should slow down the developmental process and inhibit the integration of new identities. Although emotions in the merger process can help employees position themselves toward this situation and derive meaning from it (e.g., Kiefer, 2002), the predominance of negative emotions over positive emotions can inhibit the adjustment process. Studies conducted during organizational mergers have shown that feelings of threat not only impede group members’ adjustment to this change (Terry et al., 2001) but also decrease their identification with the new merged organization (Terry, 2003; Terry & O’Brien, 2001). These findings provide support for Hornsey and Hogg’s (2000a) contention that threat is a central predictor of whether superordinate identification will occur (see also Waldzus et al., 2005) and for the fact that identity representations become less inclusive and complex during times of uncertainty and stress (Roccas & Brewer, 2002).

Research conducted in societies undergoing dramatic social changes (i.e., Russia and Mongolia, as ex-U.S.S.R. countries) has confirmed the role played by perceptions of threat (conceptualized as collective relative deprivation) in predicting lower collective esteem as a specific aspect of social identification (de la Sablonnière, Tougas, & Lortie-Lussier, 2007). In these studies, feelings of threat mediated the relation between perceptions of undergoing dramatic social changes and collective esteem (see also de la Sablonnière & Tougas, in press, for similar results in a study conducted with nurses facing organizational social change). Similarly, acculturation research has revealed positive associations between acculturation stressors (e.g., discrimination in the intercultural relations domain) and feelings of conflict among one’s different cultural identities (Benet-Martinez & Haritatos, 2005; see Phinney, 2003, for a review). Along these lines, we suggest that perceptions of threat elicited by the changing social context will play an important role in slowing or inhibiting the process of identity integration over time.

Status and power asymmetries. The role of the intergroup structure also appears crucial in inhibiting rather than facilitating social identity development. In fact, highly stratified intergroup contexts, in which groups differ in terms of status and power, should nourish the conflicts and asymmetries likely to exist among the different social identities and encourage the dominance of one social identity (possibly the one with the highest status or power) over others, thus impeding the identity-development process (Phinney, 1993, 2003). Conversely, and in line with the principles of multiculturalism, when groups share similar power and status, the development and integration of new identities should be facilitated (see Berry, 1997).

Colonialism represents a specific situation where the issue of status and power differentials arose and where a new social identity was imposed on the members of the colonized country, which also threatened the existence of their precolonial social identity. In this asymmetrical situation, Taylor (1997, 2002) discussed how the attempt to integrate elements from the colonizer’s social identity led to identity confusion among members of the colonized group as they were stripped of their original identity and presented only incompletely with elements of the colonizer’s identity. The colonization process resulted in what Taylor called an unclear collective identity among members of the colonized group, which failed to provide these group members with a shared sense of direction and a clear blueprint for action. In line with these issues of threat and status–power asymmetries, an important distinction thus exists between contexts where a change in identity is chosen (e.g., choosing to migrate to a new country) and contexts where a change in identity is not chosen or is imposed (e.g., colonization, organizational merger characterized by assimilation).

Issues of status and power asymmetries are also salient in mergers, as these organizational changes rarely involve merging partners that are of equal size, status, or power (Seo & Hill, 2005; Ullrich, Wieseke, & van Dick, 2005). Although members of a low-status premerger organization could see the merger as the opportunity to enter a higher status group and thus improve the positivity of their social identity, the possible loss of their premerger identity can also be highly threatening (e.g., Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). This is especially likely as low-status group members come to realize the concrete implications that the merger will have on their premerger organizational identity and their lack of opportunities to participate in defining the new merged organization. Support for this contention was obtained in a longitudinal merger study (Amiot, Terry, & Callan, in press). At the beginning of the merger, members of the low-status premerger organization reported high levels of psychological well-being.
However, this initial enthusiasm significantly decreased over time as these group members realized the implications of the merger (i.e., the merger was characterized by an assimilation pattern) and the threat posed to the distinctiveness of their premerger identity.

Other organizational studies have revealed that employees from low- and high-status premerger organizations respond differently to mergers and differ in their identification patterns (e.g., Terry, 2003). For instance, members of low-status groups report greater threat toward an impending merger (Terry & O’Brien, 2001) and support an integrationist merger pattern compared with high-status group members, who prefer an assimilation pattern (Giessner et al., 2006). Furthermore, employees from a low-status premerger organization have been consistently found to identify less strongly with the new merged organization than employees from the high-status premerger group, and they are less likely to perceive a common ingroup identity for the new merged organization (e.g., Terry, 2003; Terry & O’Brien, 2001; Terry et al., 2001). Employees from a dominated premerger organization (i.e., whose premerger organization has less of a say in shaping the identity of the new merged organization) also display a weaker link between their premerger organizational identity and their postmerger new merged organization identification than employees from a dominant premerger organization (van Knippenberg et al., 2002; see also van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, & Ellemers, 2003), as well as a lower sense of identity continuity (e.g., Dackert, Jackson, Brenner, & Johannson, 2003; Ulrich et al., 2005).

From our point of view, such linkages and this sense of continuity are both crucial elements of identity integration.

Facilitators of Social Identity Integration

Coping and adaptation. Coping has been defined as the person’s behavioral and cognitive efforts to manage the internal and external demands of a troubled person–environment transaction (Folkman, 1984). Whereas coping efforts can be conceptualized as developmental mechanisms (e.g., Brandstater, 1998; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995), Skinner and Edge (2002) further proposed that coping is the key loci of self-development and that prolonged negotiations with environmental demands characterize the process of integration, through which novel elements are assimilated to the self (Baumeister, 1986). We propose that coping efforts, because they represent the strategies by which individuals meet the demands of their changing environment and concretely deal with them, could represent mechanisms that facilitate the integration of new social identities (see also Anderson, 1994).

Whereas coping strategies have been found to be used when dealing with a variety of important life changes (e.g., transition to parenthood: Levy-Shiff, Dimitrosky, Shulman, & Har-Even, 1998; Terry, 1991; career transitions: Heppner, Cook, Strozier, & Heppner, 1991; residential relocation: e.g., Kling, Seltzer, & Ryff, 1997), they also operate in the context of acculturation and organizational mergers. For instance, Cross (1995) found that international students’ use of active coping strategies (e.g., planning, direct action to deal with the problem) was a particularly strong predictor of these students’ psychological well-being. Moghaddam, Taylor, Ditto, Jacobs, and Bianchi (2002) provided support for the beneficial role of active coping in predicting immigrants’ physical well-being. Kosic (2004) further showed that the use of active coping strategies in the acculturation process predicted enhanced feelings of proximity to one’s new cultural group, whereas a reliance on avoidance coping strategies (e.g., disengagement, denial) negatively predicted these feelings.

During organizational mergers, coping and adaptation strategies have been found to be operative throughout the different merging phases (Armstrong-Stassen, Cameron, Mantler, & Horsburgh, 2001; Fugate et al., 2002). Research conducted in the first months following a merger confirmed the presence of stress and threat appraisals toward this change and the importance of coping strategies in predicting employees’ adjustment (e.g., Terry & Callan, 1997; Terry, Callan, & Sartori, 1996; see also Scheck & Kinicki, 2000). Evidence for the association between active forms of coping and identification with a new social group is also emerging. Coping actions used 2 years into a merger, when some changes were still being implemented, were found to predict a stronger identification with the new merged organization (Amiot, Terry, Jimmieson, & Callan, 2006). Furthermore, in a prospective study conducted among university students over their first academic semester, a positive association was found between these students’ use of active forms of coping and their increased feelings of identification as a university student over time (Amiot, Blanchard, & Gaudreau, in press).

In traditional stress and coping models, coping has been proposed to act as a mediator between appraisals of stress or threat and different outcomes (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). In line with such models (see also Terry et al., 1996, and Terry & Jimmieson, 2003, for applications in the realm of mergers), we propose that coping could also operate as a mediator in the associations between perceptions of threat triggered by the change context and outcomes such as identity change. For instance, enhanced threat could inhibit the use of active forms of coping strategies and instead encourage the use of disengagement-oriented coping strategies. These coping strategies, in turn, would then have an impact on identity integration. Nevertheless, and for the
sake of simplicity, Figure 1 presents all of these variables as antecedents of the identity change process.

**Social support.** Developmentalists assign an important role to the social environment in the development process (e.g., Harter, 1999; Mascolo & Fischer, 1998; Vygotsky, 1978). Neo-Piagetians specifically recognize that development occurs through social interactions and scaffolding or bridging processes. Through these processes, significant others help the individual establish cognitive links between pre-existing knowledge and new material to be integrated (e.g., Fischer, 1980; Granott, Fischer, & Parziale, 2002). With respect to the development of the self, Harter (1999) proposed that although social agents should be accepting of the individual’s multiple identities, significant others (e.g., parents toward their adolescents) should actively point out the conflicts existing among identities and provide the support needed to resolve these conflicts. Social support could thus represent another important antecedent factor that facilitates the social identity integration process. In the context of social identity development, the support provided by family members, friends, teachers, and colleagues has been argued to be crucial (e.g., Phinney & Rosenthal, 1992; Ruble et al., 2004). At the group level, feeling supported by members of one’s new social group, perceiving that one can be authentic in the group context, and establishing meaningful relations with these group members (e.g., Bettencourt & Sheldon, 2001) should also have a positive impact on identity integration.

Both acculturation and merger research has revealed the importance of social support in predicting adjustment to these changes (e.g., Ataca & Berry, 2002; Terry et al., 1996; Timotijevic & Breakwell, 2000). Social support has also been found to predict the development of cultural identities. For instance, research conducted among Latino American adolescents revealed that socialization factors, such as family support for the maintenance of one’s ethnic background, predicted ethnic identity development—conceptualized as participation in ethnic behaviors and activities, and positive feelings and commitment toward this identity (Umana-Taylor & Fine, 2004). A strong cultural background, conceptualized as high levels of involvement in Hispanic culture and activities and a high percentage of Hispanic friends, also predicted lower identity threat among Hispanic students entering Ivy League universities (Ethier & Deaux, 1994). Applying a social identity approach to social support, Haslam and colleagues (Haslam, Jetten, O’Brien, & Jacobs, 2004; Haslam, O’Brien, Jetten, Vormedal, & Penna, 2005) found that informational support had a particularly positive effect in attenuating stress when it was provided by ingroup members rather than by outgroup members. When applied to issues of subgroup and superordinate levels of identification, these findings imply that identifying with more inclusive social groups (rather than with the intersection of different groups) enlarges the scope of the support received and hence maximizes well-being (see also Cross, 1995). Conceptually, the social support variable could also represent an antecedent to coping given that it has been considered an important coping resource during stressful changing contexts (e.g., Terry & Jimmieson, 2003). Coping strategies could thus also mediate the association between social support and identity integration. Again for the sake of simplicity, this antecedent variable is presented at the same level as coping in Figure 1.

**Consequences of Identity Integration**

We locate the consequences resulting from the process of social identity integration at the intergroup (i.e., discrimination and ingroup bias vs. tolerance) and individual (i.e., psychological well-being vs. intrapersonal conflict) levels. Doing so allows us to account not only for important intrapersonal consequences of social identity change and integration but also for consequences that have broader interpersonal and intergroup repercussions. Furthermore, social identity has been associated with both positive and negative consequences (see Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004, for a review). We believe that accounting for which stage of identity integration a person is at and, therefore, the manner in which social identities are cognitively organized within the self could shed light on these divergent outcomes and allow one to specify when each consequence will occur (e.g., Helms, 1990).

**Discrimination and Ingroup Bias**

Based on SIT principles, according to which discrimination and prejudice are manifested toward outgroup members but not ingroup members, identifying with a binding and inclusive superordinate category (conceiving of oneself as a member of a large and inclusive group) should reduce discrimination and ingroup bias. Because social identity integration comes about by discovering cognitive links and similarities among distinct social identities, and by identifying with a more inclusive superordinate social identity, the integration phase of our model—and in particular, the development of an additive rather than a restrictive form of identity integration—should lead to less prejudice and discrimination, less ingroup bias, and more tolerance than in the first three stages (see also Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Horsey & Hogg, 2000a; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Findings from acculturation research suggest that a more integrated and secure ethnic identity is associated with a greater acceptance of other ethnic groups (Phinney, Ferguson, & Tate,
1997). Empirical evidence obtained in the context of mergers also confirmed the negative link between identifying with an inclusive, superordinate new merged organization and bias in favor of one’s premerger ingroup (e.g., Amiot et al., in press; Lipponen, Olkkonen, & Moilanen, 2004; Terry et al., 2001; Terry & O’Brien, 2001).

Psychological Well-Being

Given that social identity integration should reduce intraindividual conflict and yield a more coherent sense of self, another likely consequence pertains to psychological adjustment and well-being (e.g., Benet-Martinez et al., 2002). Social identity, including ethnic identity, has been shown to predict enhanced well-being (e.g., Cameron, 1999; Phinney, 1995; R. E. Roberts et al., 1999) and even, in the case of stigmatized group members, to buffer against or attenuate the negative effect of discrimination (e.g., Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994). In the context of a life change such as the transition to university, Schmitt, Spears, and Branscombe (2003) found evidence for the mediating role of identification as an international student in the association between feelings of discrimination and well-being, whereas Bettencourt, Charlton, Eubanks, and Kernahan (1999) reported positive associations between an intraindividual increase in students’ identification with their residence hall (over their 1st academic year) and adjustment to college.

A growing literature has also investigated how the multiplicity of social identities predicts greater well-being (see Lafromboise et al., 1993, for a review in the domain of bilingualism). For instance, in a study aimed at investigating the relationship between ethnic and national identities among four immigrant groups, Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebind, and Vedder (2001) found that an integrated identity, conceptualized as the combination of strong ethnic and national identifications, is associated with healthy psychological adaptation. Similar findings were obtained among bilingual Canadians (R. Clément, Noels, & Deneault, 2001). With respect to superordinate identification, research conducted during changes such as organizational mergers has revealed the adaptive role of identifying with the new merged organization in predicting enhanced work adjustment and more general well-being (Terry et al., 2001; Terry & O’Brien, 2001; van Dick et al., 2004). Furthermore, and in accordance with the social cognitive literature, the specific manner by which the multitude of social identities is integrated in the self could very well predict well-being (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2003). In line with this proposition, Downie, Koestner, ElGeledi, and Cree (2004) reported that cultural integration—conceptualized as a lack of conflict between multiple cultural identities—predicted greater psychological well-being. Although offering preliminary support for the possible intrapersonal consequences of social identity integration, future studies need to be conducted to further test these associations.

COMING FULL CIRCLE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CLASSIC INTERGROUP THEORIES

One important issue at this point pertains to how we can reconcile the existence of these deeper developmental changes in social identities, through which a new identity becomes a recurrent part of the self, with the propositions made by classic intergroup theories such as SCT, according to which social identities are flexibly constructed on-line and permanent identity representations are not necessary. The need to explain this interplay between long-term and short-term changes was also noted by Condor (1996), who proposed that theories must explain how specific moments can be seen to fit together diachronically and how short-term fluctuations in social identification are reconciled with a long-term sense of continuity over time. Doing so is crucial given that a central feature of human identity involves a subjective sense of endurance over time and space. To resolve this issue, we turn first to a social cognitive view of the self and then to recent neo-Piagetian advances.

As mentioned previously, social cognitivists view the self-schema as capable of both short-term situational activation and long-term structural changes (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Smith, 1996). Similarly, social psychologists have proposed that the self is both a structure and a process (e.g., Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984), as it comprises malleable as well as more stable elements (e.g., Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987; McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, in press). As a structure, the self directs action and guides behavior in the different situations encountered and ensures a sense of continuity in the global self-system. As a process, the self is a dynamic entity that displays some flexibility in its interplay with the environment, notably by its capacity to change and to adapt to various situations. Viewing the self as both a structure and as a process allows us to reconcile SCT’s emphasis on the self as a fluid, ongoing process that focuses on the self as a succession of contextually activated self-concepts, with a view of the self as a structure that permits a sense of continuity over time and that integrates and synthesizes the multiple experiences derived from this continuous succession of different self-identifications.

Recent writings have further proposed that the elements from different hierarchical levels of the self (e.g., personality traits vs. context-specific roles) can interact and have reciprocal effects (e.g., Wood & Roberts, 2006). These properties of the self are echoed in recent neo-Piagetian writings that have proposed the existence
of both macrodevelopmental and microdevelopmental processes (Granott & Parziale, 2002; Siegler, 2005). Although macrodevelopment involves long-term and profound developmental changes, microdevelopment involves situation-specific changes over short time spans (Fischer & Granott, 1995). In line with the existence of interactive relations between different hierarchical levels in the self, some neo-Piagetians propose that situational, microdevelopmental changes can accumulate to produce long-term macrodevelopment (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Lewis, 2002; see also Demetriou et al., 1999). Lewis (2002) further proposed that this dynamic process takes place as situational activation of specific self-elements (microdevelopment) changes the connections among these elements over the long term. For instance, cumulative situational demonstrations of anger and dominance among monkeys can, over time, yield to their internalization of a more stable dominance hierarchy (Lewis, 2002).

This process is similar to the incremental changes that occur in associative networks. According to Smith (1996), if a particular stimulus is processed frequently over months and years, the resulting systematic shifts in connection weights will influence the individual’s processing characteristics for years—even a lifetime, thus resulting in chronic accessibility. In terms of social identity development and integration, these processes could operate such that the repeated exposure to situations that activate the links between the self and one’s new group and make the individual feel like a group member could accumulate to reinforce a sense of identification to this group. In other words, situations that repeatedly provide proof to an individual as to which of his or her current self-elements cohere with those of their new ingroup could strengthen the cognitive links between one’s current identities and the new social identity. Altogether, this cumulative process would allow the new social identity to become more meaningful, concrete, and important to the person’s sense of self over time and, hence, to become an enduring part of the self as a structure. These ideas also share similarities with some classic SIT propositions (Tajfel, 1978), according to which repeated exposure to situations in which individuals act in terms of a group membership will eventually enhance their identification with this group (see also McLean et al., in press, for a similar cumulative process that operates with life stories shaping the self).

**TESTING THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISES OF THE MODEL**

Given the dynamic and complex nature of the social identity integration process, we propose specific methodological recommendations that should be considered when testing the fundamental premises of the model. Methodologically, this could best be achieved by relying on longitudinal designs—as such designs are better able to capture the developmental processes occurring in the self-system (B. W. Roberts & Pomerantz, 2004)—and by monitoring individuals’ identification processes as they cope with an important change that requires the integration of a new social identity (e.g., organizational merger, immigration, becoming a member of a new community; see also Deaux, 1996). Doing so would also allow one to capture the full identity changes occurring over time (see Condor, 1996). However, longitudinal research tapping changes in identities over time is relatively rare. In the organizational literature, merger research conducted longitudinally is not the norm (e.g., Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006) and few studies have examined longitudinal changes in organizational identity (cf. Terry, 2003). In the acculturation literature, more longitudinal research has been conducted (see Gardiner, Mutter, & Kosmitzki, 1998), yet this research has focused on quantifying the degree of psychological and sociocultural adjustment and distress that occurs after a fixed period in the new country (e.g., Lerner, Kertes, & Zilber, 2005; Ward, Okura, Kennedy, & Kojima, 1998). There has been less emphasis on the developmental trajectory of the acculturation process or on the intraprimary changes associated with intercultural transitions (including changes in cultural identities over time; see Phinney, 2003; Schoenpflug, 1997).

Methods should also be devised to test directly if repeated situational activation of specific identities over extended periods and the pairing of elements coming from different identities could represent the concrete means through which these different identities become integrated. The processes through which the situational activation of social identities accumulates to produce long-term changes could be tested through experience-sampling techniques and hierarchical linear modeling. Doing so would enable one to test the dynamic processes through which the situational activation of new social identities leads to the inclusion of such identities into the person’s more general repertoire of social identities (i.e., self as a structure).

Statistically, specific procedures should be devised to test the propositions of the present model. For instance, attention needs to be paid to the assessment of identity integration. Many researchers have used bivariate correlation to assess respondents’ simultaneous identification with two social groups (e.g., Eggins et al., 2002; Jetten et al., 2002; van Knippenberg et al., 2002; van Leeuwen et al., 2003). However, more specific statistical strategies should be devised to measure simultaneous intrapersonal identification with three or more groups, to assess whether the strength of one social identity predominates relative to the others, and to capture how the entire
self-structure reorganizes as a result of a change. Along those lines, Sheldon and Niemiec (2006) have recently relied on a balance score that represents the amount of coherence among three psychological needs (i.e., autonomy, competence, relatedness). This score is created by computing the difference between each pair of needs and then summing the absolute values of the difference scores. This final difference score thus represents the total divergence among the three specific scores. This strategy could be applied to assessing the degree of integration (or lack of integration) among multiple social identities as well. Other means of tapping into identity integration could involve the use of more pictorial measures. For instance, the procedure used by Harter and Monsour (1992) allows assessment of the conflict among different identities pictorially and the affective consequences associated with such conflicts. The “pie” measure, which requires participants to divide a circle according to the importance of the different self-aspects composing their self, has also been used to assess how the importance of a new identity changes over time (e.g., Strauss & Goldberg, 1999). This methodological tool could be particularly useful to assess how we make cognitive space for a new identity within the overall self. Finally, life narrative methodologies could be used to assess how the self changes and becomes more complex over time, and how life stories come to shape the self (see Bougie & Taylor, 2007; McLean et al., in press).

CONCLUSION

The model presented in this article is designed to elucidate the specific intraindividual and developmental processes that explain how different and potentially conflicting social identities change over time and become integrated in the self. Relying on both intergroup and developmental approaches, our main objective is to propose a developmental model explaining how multiple social identities develop over time and become integrated within the self-structure. The first stage of our model—anticipatory categorization—occurs when individuals foresee a change and engage in processes that aim at clarifying the nature of the new identity that will be encountered. The second stage—categorization—deals primarily with the emergence of social identities and their all-or-none nature. The third phase—compartmentalization—aims to explain how multiple identities become important to one’s self-concept. The final stage—integration—proposes that through the resolution of possible conflicts emerging between different social identities, one integrates these multiple social identities such that they become simultaneously important to one’s sense of self.

We believe that this model not only presents a systematic framework for understanding developmental changes in social identities but also has the potential to generate future research aimed at explaining changes in social identities over time, as well as at testing the factors that inhibit versus facilitate the identity integration process and the consequences of this development process. We hope this attempt at integrating different social psychological and developmental approaches within the same theoretical model will prove fruitful in explaining a phenomenon of enduring interest: how diversity and unity can be reconciled at the intrapersonal, group, and societal levels, and how human identities and potentials can be fully enacted.

NOTE

1. A recent study by Kurzban and Aktips (2007) explored multiplicity of the self. Although a full discussion of their model is beyond the scope of this article, their model argues in favor of the importance of the differentiation of specific self-elements (or modules). However, Kurzban and Aktips argued that these modules do not necessarily need to be mutually consistent or reconciled and that keeping these self-elements isolated (encapsulated) can be adaptive.

REFERENCES


Annual Review of Psychology, 45, 297-332.

Organizational identification during a merger: Determinants of 
employees’ expected identification with the new organization. 
British Journal of Management, 17, 549-567.


(BII): Components and psychosocial antecedents. Journal of Personality, 
73, 1015-1050.

Negotiating biculturalism: Cultural frame switching in biculturals 

New York: Psychology Press.


New York: Cambridge University Press.

Berry, J. W. (2006). Social roles as mechanisms of 
accommodation and adaptation in a life transition. 

In W. Damon (Series Ed.) & R. M. Lerner (Vol. Ed.), 


