

Perceptual moments of conscious visual experience inferred from oscillatory brain activity

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Transient periods of synchronized oscillating neuronal discharges in the brain have been proposed to support the discrete perceptual moments underlying conscious visual experience. However, the information content of these perceptual moments remains a critical challenge to the understanding of consciousness. We uncovered this information content in four observers who consciously perceived each interpretation of the ambiguous Dali painting *Slave Market with the Disappearing Bust of Voltaire*. For each individual observer, we isolated the stimulus spatial frequency (SF) features underlying their overt judgments of the input as “the nuns” and “Voltaire”. Every 2 ms between stimulus onset and overt response, we derived the sensitivity of the observer’s oscillatory brain activity (in the theta, alpha, and beta bandwidths) to these SF features. Then, in each bandwidth, we estimated the moments (between stimulus onset and perceptual judgment) when perception-specific SF features were maximally integrated, corresponding to perceptual moments. We show that the centroparietal beta oscillations support perceptual moments underlying the conscious perception of the nuns, whereas theta oscillations support the perception of Voltaire. For both perceptions, we reveal the specific information content of these perceptual moments.

computational models | ambiguous perception |
computational neuroscience | electroencephalogram

To study conscious visual experience in an information system such as the brain, two generic questions must be addressed. The first question is one of form: What is the nature of the brain activity supporting the perceptual moments associated with conscious visual experience; that is, what are the neural correlates of consciousness? The second question is one of content: What is the information content of the perceptual moments associated with conscious visual experience; that is, what is the information content of the neural correlates of consciousness?

The common answer to the question of form is a proposal with a long history (1–3), suggesting that the dynamics of psychological states is related to the oscillatory activity of the neural substrate, which recently has been cast in terms of binding multiple information sources (4–6). Simply stated, synchronized discharges of cortical cell assemblies with a prominent rhythm would be the neural correlates supporting discrete cognitive and perceptual conscious states (7–9). This theory is based on evidence of a consistent relationship between behavioral variables and the frequency of both the theta (4–8 Hz) and alpha rhythms (8–12 Hz) in memory (10–16) and perceptual tasks (7, 17–19). Furthermore, there is a relationship between visual perception and faster rhythms in the beta (12–25 Hz) and gamma (25–60 Hz) range, although this hypothesis is still controversial (20, 21).

In contrast, there is no common answer to the question of the information content of perceptual moments, although, as just discussed, it is supposed that conscious visual experience arises under specific parametric conditions of synchronized brain rhythms. An important task, then, is to ascribe information content to the parameters of oscillatory brain activity (22, 23). This goal is the main aim of this article.

In an experiment, we used gray-level versions of Dali’s ambiguous painting *The Slave Market with Disappearing Bust of Voltaire* to induce conscious perceptions. This stimulus can induce two distinct phenomenal states (the perception of “the nuns” vs. “Voltaire”) from two distinct feature subsets of the same original image, creating a situation of perceptual ambiguity for the visual system to resolve (24). On each trial, we created a sparse version of the painting by randomly sampling visual information from five nonoverlapping one-octave spatial frequency (SF) bandwidths as illustrated in Fig. 1. Observers pressed response keys to indicate whether they perceived the information samples as the nuns, Voltaire, or “don’t know” (24). Concurrently, we measured the electroencephalogram (EEG) activity on each trial.

After the experiment, we applied classification image techniques (i.e., “bubbles”; see refs. 24–26), independently for each observer (*i*) to compute the SF features correlated with behavioral judgments of the nuns and Voltaire (see Fig. 2) and (*ii*) to compute the SF features correlated with modulations of centroparietal EEG amplitudes (in the theta, alpha, and beta bands; see Fig. 3). Then, we compared (*i*) and (*ii*) to determine the time intervals (i.e., the perceptual moments) over which the brain processes the specific SF features underlying each observer’s conscious perceptions of the nuns and Voltaire.

Results and Discussion

Evidence of Perceptual Moments. The critical advantage of expressing a brain signal in terms of its sensitivity to visual features is that one can precisely track in time the processing of features and their integration in the brain (see *Methods*). To illustrate, Fig. 4 depicts the average (across observers, $n = 4$) first- and second-order feature sensitivity measures in the theta, alpha, and beta bands for each perception. Over the time interval of 200–300 ms for the nuns (the overlaid red strip in Fig. 4) and 150–350 ms for Voltaire (the overlaid blue strip in Fig. 4), we found a main moment of feature sensitivity (i.e., a perceptual moment defined by using the maxima of first- and second-order measures). However, this feature sensitivity peaked in parietal theta oscillations for Voltaire, whereas it peaked in beta oscillations for the nuns, with an overall timing congruent with that found in related studies (21, 27); note that this timing was uncorrelated with the reaction times of observers (see Table 1; $r = 0.052$), ruling out an explanation in terms of motor response. We now explore the specific information contents of these perceptual moments in the beta band (for the nuns) and theta band (for Voltaire).

Information Content of Perceptual Moments. Consider observer EO in Fig. 5. Four gray-scale images depict the information

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Abbreviations: SF, spatial frequency; HSF, high-SF; LSF, low-SF; EEG, electroencephalogram.

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


Fig. 3. Computation of sensitivity of EEG oscillations to the features underlying overt perceptual judgments of the nuns in observer GB. (A) Step 1: Behavioral classification images. Illustration of the SF-specific features underlying overt perceptual judgments of the nuns for observer GB (significant features are labeled a and e; $P < 0.05$). (B) Step 2: EEG classification images. The movie of classification images indicated with an arrow illustrates the beta band EEG classification images for the second band of sampled SF information in the critical 190 and 248 ms after stimulus onset. At each time point, the images standing above and below the classification image (Middle) represent the sums of the bubble masks associated with EEG amplitudes 0.25 SD above (Top) and 0.25 SD below (Bottom) the mean amplitude at this time point. The two EEG classification images highlighted by a red box are expanded, thresholded for significance ($P < 0.05$), and interpreted by apposing their significant regions onto the ambiguous image at SF band 2. They reveal that, at these time points, beta EEG amplitudes are modulated by features c and d. (C) Step 3: Relating behavioral and EEG classification images. We computed the sensitivity of the EEG classification images to behavioral features c and d by using Pearson's correlation to correlate the latter with the former. The white box is expanded in B, where the blue curve indicates the correlation with feature c and the green curve indicates the correlation with feature d. Generalizing across all features and time points, we obtain the illustrated sensitivity matrix. Labeled features (i.e., c, d, and e) indicate periods of significant correlations ($P < 0.01$, Z scored with respect to prestimulus baseline correlations) for observer GB perceiving the nuns.

HSF band information with sample size corresponding to the size of the head anywhere in the HSF image as long as this sample did not overlap with any significant feature (i.e., the left or right nuns' face).

Specifically, for each behavioral feature, we correlated one hundred of these observer-specific randomly positioned SF templates with the EEG classification images in the theta, alpha, and beta bandwidths. This computation allowed us to measure the average generic (as opposed to perception-specific) sensitivity of beta, alpha, and theta oscillations to SF band information. Fig. 4 depicts the average (across templates and observers) perception-specific and generic SF first-order sensitivity measures. These results clearly rule out the generic SF-processing interpretation in favor of a multiplexing of specific perceptual content across the beta and theta oscillations.

Conclusions

Together, the evidence reported here supports the idea that oscillatory brain activity underlies the processing of visual information subtending the perceptual moments of conscious visual experience. Specifically, we have shown that in the context of an ambiguous input stimulus, theta oscillations subsumed the processing and integration of LSF visual features associated with the overt perceptual judgment of Voltaire and that beta oscillations supported higher SF features associated with the overt

judgment of the nuns. Furthermore, we isolated for each observer the specific information content of their perceptual moments, quantifying the subjective content of perceptual experience from brain measurements.

There is now a growing body of knowledge on the brain correlates of conscious visual experience (21, 27–29). However, unique to our approach, we do not correlate important parameters of brain activity (such as rhythm, amplitude, or phase coherence) with a few experimental conditions (e.g., to perceive or not). Instead, we correlate brain activity with fine-grained samples of stimulus information (in which each information sample can be construed as an independent experimental condition) to derive a precise mapping of brain activity onto visual information. From this mapping, we relate the dynamics of information processing with the dynamics of brain states (25, 30). With this approach, we uncovered for each observer two distinct perceptual moments, corresponding to the maximal sensitivity of brain rhythms to the specific SF features subtending the perception of the nuns and Voltaire.

Perceptual moments allow new fundamental issues for perception to be addressed, ranging from the information capacity of the different bandwidths of oscillatory activity (the number of bits of information that they can encode), the mechanisms of information integration within a moment, to the relationship between discrete moments and the apparently seamless nature of perceptual awareness and perception.




Fig. 5. Perceptual moments and their information content. For observers EO and GB, the four gray-level pictures illustrate the significant labeled SF features (a–f) associated with their overt judgments of the nuns and Voltaire. The first- and second-order sensitivities of beta (for the nuns) and theta (for Voltaire) oscillations to these SF features are rendered in the two adjacent colored graphs. Labeled rows are those for which first- and second-order sensitivities reached significance ($P < 0.01$). The red (beta; for the nuns) and blue (theta; for Voltaire) line plots reveal the average first- and second-order sensitivities across all individual SF features (for the first-order) and SF feature combinations (for the second-order) for this EEG band. The red strip (for the nuns) and blue strip (for Voltaire) indicate the perceptual moments at which oscillatory sensitivity to SF features peaks.

Step 2: Oscillatory EEG classification images. We considered three main brain rhythms (theta, 4–8 Hz; alpha, 8–12 Hz; and beta, 12–25 Hz), measured on centroparietal electrode Pz[†] in relation to the visual information represented in the four bandwidths of SF information sampled with bubbles that were relevant for behavior. For each combination of brain rhythm and SF band sampled (e.g., beta oscillations and the highest SF), we computed an independent classification image every 2 ms between –200 and 800 ms around stimulus onset. To compute the EEG classification images, we determined for each measurement time point the mean amplitude value of the filtered EEG signal[‡] across all nonartifact trials, considering only trials on which the observer perceived something (i.e., pooling together the nuns

and Voltaire trials, whereas discarding don't know trials). We then assigned the bubble mask used on each of these trials to one of three bins: above, below, or around (–0.25 to 0.25 SD) the mean amplitude, depending on the EEG amplitude elicited on that trial. The EEG classification image was the sum of the bubble masks above the mean minus the sum of the bubble masks below the mean. By computing an independent classification image every 2 ms, we are able to represent at a fine temporal resolution how SF-specific information in the input modulates the amplitude of EEG oscillations.

Consider Fig. 3B, which illustrates the process for observer GB. EEG classification images are computed between 190 and 248 ms, in the beta band of EEG oscillations, for the second band of sampled SF information. The “movie” of classification images is indicated with a right-pointing arrow in Fig. 3B. Two classification images (highlighted with red boxes in Fig. 3B) are expanded for illustration, thresholded for their significant regions ($P < 0.05$), and interpreted by revealing the features correlated with modulations of beta amplitudes (here *c* is the face of the left nun, and *d* is the dress of the left nun). These computations were independently carried out for all oscillatory

[†]We chose to measure from the centroparietal electrode Pz because previous work revealed evidence of nonlinear integration of featural information over this electrode site (30). In contrast, we did not find evidence of such early feature integration on occipitotemporal electrodes (e.g. P9 and P10).

[‡]We band-pass filtered the EEG with a smooth sixth-order Butterworth filter with cutoffs on 4 and 8 Hz for the theta band, 8 and 12 Hz for the alpha band, and 12 and 24 Hz for the beta band.

bands considered (i.e., theta, alpha, and beta) and four of the input SF bands sampled (i.e., discarding the lowest SFs).

Step 3: Relating Steps 1 and 2. First-order sensitivity. To determine the first-order sensitivities of the EEG activity to the features associated with behaviour, we correlated the EEG classification images with those features found to be significantly driving perceptual judgements by using Pearson's correlation. For the case of Voltaire, our behavioural templates consisted simply of the significant facial regions at each one of the SF bands. For the nuns, behavioural templates individuated the visual features present at each band. In Fig. 3A, features *a* to *e* contributed to the overt perceptual judgments of observer GB. Fig. 3B illustrates the correlations of behavioral features *c* (in blue) and *d* (in green) with the EEG classification images. Note that these correlations are cyclical (indicating that the sensitivity to the SF features is not sustained, but periodic, in accordance with refs. 7 and 9) and peak in the first sensitivity cycle at ≈ 208 ms and in the second cycle at ≈ 236 ms. Closer scrutiny of the classification images around these peaks (see the red boxes) reveal that EEG beta oscillatory amplitudes are modulated by the presence of features *c* and *d*, as is behavior. Fig. 3C presents a summary of sensitivity to all SF nun features in the beta band (the white box corresponds to the time interval expanded in Fig. 3B). Generalising this analysis to the two perceptions (i.e., the nuns and Voltaire), the three EEG oscillatory bands (theta, alpha, and beta) and the four bands of sampled SF information, we derived the first-order sensitivity measurements presented independently for each observer in Figs. 5 and 6.

Second-order sensitivity. To determine the levels of information integration within each perception (for the nuns, across SF features; for Voltaire, across SF bands), we derived for each possible combination of SF features and SF bands the phase dependencies of the first-order sensitivities. We reasoned that a perceptual moment correlated with the conscious perception of a stimulus should isolate a moment in time when sensitivity to the information components (i.e., SF features or SF bands) should (i) be at its peak (ii) synchronously for the largest number of components (to illustrate, Fig. 3B indicates that the sensitivity curves to features *c* and *d* are in such synchrony). To this end, we used a standard method of phase-synchrony determination (31) and computed the convolution of the first-order sensitivity with a complex Morlet wavelet of form:

$$M(t, f) = e^{\frac{-t^2}{2\sigma_t^2}} \cdot e^{i2\pi ft}, \quad [1]$$

centered at the center frequency (*f*) of each band considered with $\sigma_t = 6/f$. The phase of this convolution ($\phi(t)$) was then extracted for all times, *t*, and combinations of SF features and SF bands. The second-order phase sensitivity measure for each combination was then computed in temporal blocks of half a period at the band center frequency as follows:

$$\text{SOP}_t = \frac{1}{N} \left| \sum_{t=1}^n e^{i(\phi_1(t) - \phi_2(t))} \right|, \quad [2]$$

where *N* is the number of points in each time block. In any comparison, if the phase difference varies little across the time in each half-period block, this value will be close to 1, indicating a synchronous sensitivity between two information components. If the phase of the signals is uncorrelated, however, the value will fall to 0, indicating a low synchrony between the components considered.

Note that, as computed in Eq. 2, phase relationships do not account for the magnitude of sensitivity of oscillatory processes to the compared information components (i.e., two SF features or two SF bands). Given that our goal is to isolate those phase-locked information components to which oscillatory brain processes are highly sensitive, we introduced an amplitude factor AF_t to our second-order measurement SOM_t :

$$\text{SOM}_t = \text{SOP}_t \cdot \text{AF}_t. \quad [3]$$

In AF_t , $\text{FOM}(t, f_i)$ is the first-order sensitivity measured for feature f_i at each time point. If the first-order value of each feature is high, then this value will be close to 1. If the EEG classification images were not sensitive to that feature, however, this value will fall to 0.

$$\text{AF}_t = \sqrt{\sum_{t=1}^n \text{FOM}(t, f_1) \cdot \text{FOM}(t, f_2)}. \quad [4]$$

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