Trois raisons pour la patrilinéarité du corps social:

1) Image inchangeable et constante du corps social – image du mâle comparée aux images du corps féminin (images «vénusiennes» du néolithique représentées par les femmes grasses, p.e., Venus de Willendorf): l'excès de gras est la seule façon de représenter le corps féminin sous forme relativement inchangeable – l'obésité cache les changements constants qui sont propres au corps féminin. Le corps masculin est relativement constant dans ses formes comparé au corps féminin et donc mieux adapté pour représenter la stabilité et la continuité. L'image du corps social est donc masculine, dans un contexte où le les représentations du territoire (en fait, du contrôle politique du territoire) sont féminines (p.e., Italia) et donc censées être «faibles». L'image du corps social masculin est donc une représentation de la reproduction sociale et donc du temps «atemporelle», en contraste et en comparaison avec l'image féminine du territoire «faible» et «fragile» (voulant souligner l'obligation d'intervenir avec la vertu «masculine»).

(Voir Power Point sur l'image du féminin)

2) Quand la femme étrangère (c.-à-d., l'épouse qui n'est pas membre du lignage de son mari) dans une maisonnée patrilinéaire (p.e., sociétés magrébines) est souvent accordée un statut bas en public, on cherche la raison dans la soi-disant tradition; dans le cas du Magrébe, dans la tradition musulmane. Mais deux facteurs sont ignorés: ce statut bas se manifeste uniquement dans le domaine public, et il s'agit de sociétés paysannes, où le stock de terres disponible est limité. L'entre-aide typique de ces sociétés crée des liens étroits entre frères et parenté patrilatéral, rendant impossible l'acquisition de terres au cours du cycle de vie de la maisonnée (nécessaire pour les dots et la succession). Les transferts de propriété (achats) sont quasi impossibles entre partenaires et entre membres du clan patrilinéaire, qui ne veulent pas mettre au risque leur rapport de collaboration en donnant l'avantage économique à l'un ou à l'autre. Les femmes deviennent donc des boucs émissaires et des véhicules parfaits pour ces négociations – étant étrangères, on peut invoquer l'épouse comme la raison (l'harmonie domestique) pour des négociations financières autrement injustifiables ou, dans certains cas, elles peuvent négocier l'acquisition, car elles ne sont pas accablées par la notion que famille lignagère doit être solidaire.

3) Patrilinearity (or patrilineal ideology, to be more precise) is not only a means of tying people in the present to the past in a structured way, as most standard approaches in introductory anthropology courses have affirmed (and usually only in introductory courses because most contemporary anthropologists no longer deal with the issue), -- Service, Sahlins -- it is also an expression of a community's view of continuity, of the future, of its desire to survive and thrive, which by necessity takes account of others'

views of one's community. At the very least, a community's survival depends in part on the ability of its members to reach a compromise with others. Whatever the particular details of such a compromise, however, a community will affirm a vision of itself vis-à-vis others that reiterates its basic political philosophy no matter how compromised its frontiers may be. Patrilinearity, in other words, may be tied to tradition, but tradition is tied to alterity.

In order to understand patrilineal ideology and its main manifestation as a male-gendered social body, one can start with its opposite, matrilinearity. Not so well studied as patrilinearity because statistically rarer, at least one case of matrilinearity has been theorised (Korovkin and Lanoue 1988; Lanoue 1993) as a desire to conceptualise a link to others in such a way that the community (the Tsimshian of Pacific Northwest) is simultaneously linked to others in highly structured ways (linearity allows *representations* of links to others to be highly predictable and very manageable over time, although of course they are not at all predictable in terms of experiential reality) and yet maintains an image of an intact, autonomous and independent social body. In practical terms, the Tsimshian have combined three variables in their model of their community – matrilineal descent and the rules governing marriage choices and post-marital residence – in such a way that one community is represented as connected to two others. This creates a triadic model, the model with the most components that it is possible to build using these three variables. Matrilinearity allows the Tsimshian to represent themselves as being 'open' to others and yet autonomous. It is only possible to represent openness by being matrilineal: as it turns out, two others is the maximum number of communities that can be represented with these three components. With the same rules of marriage and residence but substituting matrilinearity with patrilinearity, the model would be dyadic; that is, it would represent one community tied to one other, not two others. In contrast to matrilinearity, patrilinearity represents the community as tied to as few others as possible. In brief, these models – patrilineal or matrilineal – are not meant as ideals that are to be implemented. The Tsimshian have an entirely different set of rules to regulate marriage (based on the villages of origin of the mothers of the future spouses), residence (which is only avunculocal or patrilocal for nobles), and descent (there are complicated rules governing access to resources that have nothing to do with matrilineal ideology as such). In daily life, therefore, matrilineal 'descent' is unimportant. The 'rules', which are sometimes alleged to be ideals meant to inspire and mould behaviour, are there only to build a model of the social universe, to imagine and represent their community in a world of similar communities.

Although most writers agree that the Tsimshian had matrilineal descent (despite disagreements about its significance) and favoured patrilocal residence, there is considerable disagreement over the pattern of marriage they practiced. Some authors including Boas (1916:440), Garfield (1950:23, 1939:231-32), and Rosman and Rubel (1971:10-33), argue that the Tsimshian preferred matrilateral cross-cousin marriage.

Others (Kasakoff 1974; Adams 1973) favour the view that marriages did not follow this pattern, while some (Cove 1976) argue that the type of marriage depended on a person's rank. These differences can be resolved into the question of what role a "tradition" (Boas 1916:44) of MoBrDa (Mother's Brother's Daughter) marriage plays in structuring actual choices.

Kasakoff[6] describes a complex pattern of marriage choices and regulations. In her view the Gitksan Tsimshian she studied (including data from 1850 onwards) possess a classical Lévi-Straussian complex structure. Their rules are essentially restrictive; that is, they are based on prohibited categories rather than on preferred or prescribed categories whose membership is regu lated by means of lineally inherited and hence exclusive statuses. She found (Kasakoff 1974: 151) that marriage is phratric-exogamous as defined by Tsimshian conscious models, but is more attuned to residential criteria in practice. A statistically significant proportion of marriages occurs between children of parents who now live within the same village but were born in different villages. Such children are "outsiders" (Kasakoff's term) who wish to become "insiders" by marrying someone whose parents were born in the same village as themselves. Marriages between people whose mothers were born outside the village (not unlikely, given patrilocality) are avoided, as are marriages between people whose mothers were born in the village of residence. The first tendency reveals a concern with incorporating "outsiders" into the village, while the second points to a tendency to link people from different villages. The locality-incorporative feature of linking "outsiders" and "insiders" is enhanced by the tendency to repeat marriages between a cluster of several houses. Perhaps the most significant of Kasakoff's findings is that everyone avoids bilateral kin in practice. Last, there is a stated preference -- not statistically confirmed -- to marry into Mofa's or MoMo's house. These complex ambiguities point to an implicitly bilateral structure, as Kasakoff puts it (1974: 157), despite the explicitly formulated cultural framework of exclusive matrilineal categories that are said by the Tsimshian to regulate marriage choices.[7] In sum, marriages are formulated in practice using a criterion that operates within the village/house continuum, but they are nevertheless represented using criteria characteristic of the phratry/lineage. Adams (1973:39) is unequivocal on this point: "the Gitksan forbid marriage between people who share rights to the same resources or who have come under the influence of the same authority-which amounts to the same thing."

Consciously, the Gitksan state that they try to bind people or different exclusive groups through marriage, but in practice their ideological compromise between aggregation (exclusively defined groups) and dispersal (splitting marriage and residence rules so that the widest number of possible linkages is entertained) tends to fold in on itself. Their complex "unconscious" (Kasakoff's terminology, by which is meant "actual") marriage choices reveal an ambiguity towards links formed far and near (marriages between the same houses tend to repeat, but obviously not within the same village). This mirrors the simplified but "conscious" model of phratric exogamy and MoBrDa's marriage that the Tsimshian hold.

This latter model can be seen as an attempt to balance "far" links against "near" through marriage and thus maintain exclusivity of group membership in terms of the phratric/lineage continuum. The difference between the conscious model and the actual pattern of choice -- not made unconsciously, for that matter[8] -- appears to be that the conscious model defines exclusivity in terms of the phratry, whereas their actual ("unconscious") marriage choices express the same concern in terms of the house/village continuum. The fact that few people adhere to this supposedly rigid marriage rule points to the structural importance of symbolic representation of the process that defines exclusivity and inclusivity.

We know that the ancient Romans were patrilineal, despite older, somewhat bizarre 19th century affirmations to the contrary (for example, Bachofen's *The Legend of Tanaquil*, in Kiefer 1934). We will never know what circumstances pushed them to represent themselves as more autonomous, with fewer ties to others – a desire to hoard scarce resources, or a desire to keep plentiful resources at home rather than have many claims on them from marriage partners. In any case, patrilineal ideology was part of their view of themselves as a community in such a way that they stressed autonomy by limiting ties to others. Roman first, Latin (or Italian) second. Their mythology supports this hypothesis: they would not have kidnapped Sabine women if the Sabines had been part of the Other with which the Romans had ties. It is only *after* the 'rape' of the Sabines (in its archaic sense of abduction) that Romans and Sabines came to an agreement that led to the Sabines, men and women, being absorbed by the Romans. We do know that the earliest Roman political system blended some aspects of choice – leading officials were elected – and soviet-style consensus: each administrative unit voted as a block (Crawford 1978:194), like the individual states in the Electoral College in American elections. This and other traits (clientelism, the many overlapping assemblies and legislative bodies) suggests the Romans were aware of the fragile nature of their polity and took every measure to reinforce it, although they also seem to have been aware that this unique combination of patrician democracy, oligarchy, and outdated legislative forms that necessitated constant reinterpretation to fit changing circumstances was at the heart of their imperial strength. In this atmosphere, it seems likely that they would stress internal solidarity and avoid representations that gave hints of a porous political and cultural frontier.

In fact, they took great care to define 'Roman' in political and not cultural terms, since they strongly resembled their Latin-speaking ('Italian') neighbours. Favoured partners might be admitted to the Roman alliance as citizens but without the vote, *civitas sine suffragio*, creating resentment among the allies, as the Romans were aware:

> The fate of the Italians [non-Roman Latins] was as savage as their cause was truly just; for they were demanding citizenship in the state whose empire they defended with their arms. In every year and in every war they served with twice as many foot and horse as the Romans and yet were not given the right of citizenship in the very state which had reached through their efforts so high a position that it could *look with contempt on men of the same race and blood as if they were outsiders and foreigners*. (Velleius, 1st century AD historian, cited in Crawford 1978:129-130; my italics)

This insular attitude lasted many centuries, till the reforms of Emperor Claudius at the time Velleius was writing.

Their origin myths may also hold clues as to why the ancient Romans tried to downplay the role of others in defining themselves as a community and hence developed a patrilineal ideology. Romulus, in various versions, was a descendant of interlopers to central Italy (Aeneas, a grandson of Priam king of Troy, according to Virgil's state-sanctioned version, the *Aeneid*), a shepherd (a person without roots), a bastard or a descendant of a bastard (in Plutarch, he was the son of an illicit relation with a Vestal virgin of Alba Longa, who happened to be the daughter of the legitimate king deposed by his brother), a foundling (abandoned and found in basket floating on the Tiber by Faustulus), raised by a prostitute (Faustulus' wife, Acca Larentia, was a prostitute; according to Plutarch, prostitutes were nicknamed she-wolves, la Lupa), and, finally, a fratricide (he killed his twin Remus when he derisively jumped over the walls of the city founded by Romulus). I do not think the *Aeneid* was an attempt to prettify Roman origins by claiming descent from Troy's royal house. After all, the Trojans were double losers since they had been conquered by a people later conquered by the Romans. The thread that seems to run through all these accounts is Roman pride in their lowly, illegitimate origins and in their status as interlopers in the local Latin society they eventually assimilated (the Sabines) or conquered (the Samnites). Although there are many versions and inconsistent assertions, it is very suggestive that the one element that appears in all versions, the one thing that finally establishes the Roman line, is the Romulus killing Remus for deriding the shoddy construction of the Romulus' walls around his settlement. Porous boundaries lead to a fight to the death. It is as if they projected their ties to outsiders to the past and to a distant place, Troy, where foreigners would seem less threatening in the present. It is suggestive that the *Aeneid* was published by Augustus, the first Emperor, *before* the Claudian reforms.

This is admittedly speculation; even fun. We will never know precisely what drove the Romans to favour an image of their community as virile, to define men as 'naturally' strong and women as 'naturally' weak and to select patrilinearity to define a type of cohesion attributed to their fictive tribes and clans (fictive in the sense that these distinctions were maintained in rhetoric long after the units had been eclipsed by the unifying force of citizenship). It is no accident that *virtus*, 'virtue', a word loaded with positive political

connotations for the ancient Romans (and, for that matter, the Victorians and the Fascists), derives from *vir*, 'man'. The fact remains that they were patrilineal, valued physical and moral courage that they attributed to men and not to women and saw themselves as a small, exclusive and *imperialist* community.