

The Voices of Reason

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THE VOICES OF REASON

Chrisoula Andreou

It is widely held that instrumental reasoning to a practical conclusion is parasitic on non-instrumental practical reasoning. This conclusion is based on the claim that when there is no reason to adopt a certain end, there is no reason to take the means (*qua* means) to that end. But, as will be argued, while there is a sense of *reason* according to which the previous statement is true, there is another sense according to which it is false. Furthermore, in both of the relevant senses of *reason*, it is true that reasons are considerations that ground correct conclusions of practical deliberation and correct advice. It follows that instrumental reasoning to a practical conclusion is *not* invariably parasitic on non-instrumental practical reasoning. The view that it is results from combining the idea that when there is no reason to adopt a certain end, there is no reason to take the means (*qua* means) to that end, with the common but faulty assumption that considerations that ground correct conclusions of practical deliberation and correct advice are all reasons in a single sense (sometimes referred to as the normative sense of *reason*). The assumption in question is implicit in, for example, the work of John Broome, T. M. Scanlon, Christine Korsgaard, and Stephen

Darwall.¹ Given the common identification of normative reasons with considerations that ground correct conclusions of practical deliberation and correct advice, the position that will be defended in this paper can be expressed by saying that there is not one but two senses of *reason* for which it is true that reasons are normative (or, equivalently, that there is not one but two normative senses of the term *reason*).²

The view that instrumental reasoning to a practical conclusion is parasitic on non-instrumental practical reasoning has been put forward by some as a devastating objection to the Humean view that practical reasoning is essentially instrumental reasoning because there are no rationally required ends.³ The objection is, however, misguided, since there is room for the Humean view captured by the following two contentions: (i) while there is a sense of *reason* according to which one has no reason to take the means (*qua* means) to an end unless one has reason to take the end, there are no reasons in the sense in question because there are no rationally required ends; (ii) the only *legitimate* form of instrumental reasoning to a practical conclusion is the form that is not parasitic on non-instrumental practical reasoning.

I.

In the sections that follow, reference will be made not only to normative reasons and normative-reason-statements, but also to normative-should-statements. Normative-reason-statements of the form “There is reason for A to X” fall short of a conclusion about what is to be done, in the way that normative-should-statements do not, or at least need not.

Note also that as the term *advice* will be used, there is a necessary connection between practical deliberation and advice. More specifically, it is in the same sense(s) of *should* that both advice and practical deliberation aim at figuring out what the agent should do. As such, not all norm-based statements of the form “You should X” qualify as advice in the relevant sense. Relatedly, not all norm-based statements of the form “You should X” are put forward as normative in the relevant sense. For example, “You should use a fountain pen” in the following snippet does not figure as advice in the relevant sense, and is not put forward as normative in the relevant sense:

Brown (*Flipping through Wilson’s Book of Everyday Etiquette*): O.K. last question: Should I use a fountain pen or felt tip marker when I’m writing a thank-you letter?

Jones: You should use a fountain pen.

Brown: Wow, you really do have this down pat!

Jones: I told you, my parents trained me well. Of course, it’s all pointless nonsense.

Jones is not saying or implying that practical reason dictates choosing fountain pens over felt tip markers when writing thank-you letters. Indeed, Jones’s should-statement is presented as eminently ignorable as a guide to action.

Of course Jones’s claim that etiquette is all pointless nonsense may be resisted. On the one hand, one might suppose that most considerations of etiquette are not to be ig-

nored in practical deliberation because most reasons of etiquette are also—or else hook up with—normative reasons. On the other hand, one might suppose that, though its reason-giving force can be defeated, the consideration that something is required by etiquette is (or is often) a normative reason. If this latter supposition is correct, then figuring out what one should do from the point of view of etiquette will often be part of figuring out what is called for by practical reason. Otherwise put, figuring out what one should do from the point of view of etiquette will often be part of arriving at a correct normative-should-statement (understood as an all-things-considered conclusion of practical deliberation).

II.

This section focuses on an example of practical deliberation in order to pick out the two normative senses of “There is reason for A to X,” where the statement is a statement about A’s reasons and so might also be expressed as “A has reason to X.” The point of the section is really just to have the distinction in sense emerge as clear and intuitively plausible. Most of the case for the distinction is in the next few sections.⁴

Suppose Bri has been invited to a party. She deliberates about whether to go. On the pro side she includes: that she would have fun at the party; and that she could bring Oliver along, and so help him get his mind off his worries. On the con side she includes: that she will be too tired to work on her garden the next morning; and that getting to the party will be inconvenient. Suppose she comes to the conclusion that, all things considered, she should stay home. Unable, however, to resist an evening of fun, she decides to go, and then thinks “We’re going to need two bus tickets. I should go get some now before the bus station closes and it’s too late.” On the way to the station, she scolds herself several times with “I shouldn’t be doing this. I’m really quite pathetic.”

Note that Bri is treating getting some bus tickets before the bus station closes as a necessary means to going to the party. It will be assumed that there is some way of making sense of Bri's construal of the situation. Perhaps Bri correctly believes that getting some bus tickets before the bus station closes is the only means of going to the party that is consistent with her other intentions. Note also that once Bri forms the intention to go to the party, she concludes that she should go get some bus tickets before the station closes, not that she should go to the party. The example would definitely be less mundane—indeed, it would be downright weird—if, after concluding that she should not go to the party but deciding to go anyway, Bri then thought “I should go to the party,” though she found no flaw in her prior reasoning. (In a weirder case than Bri's, the agent might have the odd view that if she intends to do something, then she should do it, even if her intention to do the thing in question is *akratic*.⁵)

Consider the two normative-should-statements “I should go get some bus tickets before the station closes” and “I should not be doing this [going to get some tickets now before the bus station closes], because I should not go to the party—I should stay home.” Given the context in which they appear, both statements seem to be true, and yet how this can be the case seems to require some explanation. The contention that will be supported in this paper is that the “should” in the first statement differs in sense from the “shoulds” in the second statement. “A should X,” where *should* is being used as it is in the first statement, implies that there is some $Y \neq X$ such that A's X-ing would serve A's intention to Y. “A should X,” where *should* is being used as it is in the second statement, does not imply that there is some $Y \neq X$ such that A's X-ing would serve A's intention to Y.

Note that, as the terms *intend* and *intention* are being employed, one intends to X if and

only if one has an intention to X, and it is *not* a necessary condition of having an intention to X that one be fairly certain that one will succeed in X-ing. One may, for example, intend to win a race against a worthy opponent. The term *want* is sometimes used to mean “intend” in the relevant sense. Notice, however, that in the philosophically familiar sense of *want* according to which wanting to X comes to having a pro-attitude toward X-ing, wanting to X is not sufficient for having an intention to X. For one can have a pro-attitude toward X-ing, without having any intention to X. One may, for example, have a desire to buy a convertible, and yet have no intention of doing so.

Corresponding to the two senses of *should* that have been picked out are two different modes of advice, namely advice in the *instrumental intention-based mode* and advice in the *possibly non-intention-serving mode*. “You should X” counts as advice in the instrumental intention-based mode if it can be sincerely maintained only if the adviser believes that there is some $Y \neq X$ such that the advisee's X-ing would serve her intention to Y. “You should go get some bus tickets before the stations closes”—said to Bri by someone who takes it that Bri has the intention to go to the party, but who does not realize that Bri has already arrived at the same conclusion herself—can be interpreted as advice in the instrumental intention-based mode. By contrast, “You should X,” interpreted as advice in the possibly non-intention-serving mode, can be sincerely offered even if the adviser does not believe and has no reason to believe that the advisee has any intention $Y \neq X$ that would be served by her X-ing; the advice is put forward as correct regardless of whether the agent has any such intention. “You should stay home”—said to Bri by someone who takes it that Bri has been invited to the party, but who does not realize that Bri has already arrived at the same conclusion herself—can be interpreted as advice in the possibly non-

intention-serving mode. (The label “possibly non-intention-serving” is supposed to highlight the fact that, in contrast with correct advice in the instrumental intention-based mode, it is quite *possible*, though not inevitable, that actions recommended by correct advice in the possibly non-intention-serving mode may *fail to serve any of the agent’s intentions*.)

Corresponding to the two modes of advice, namely advice in the instrumental intention-based mode and advice in the possibly non-intention-serving mode, are two normative senses of “There is reason for A to X,” or equivalently “A has reason to X.” In one sense, A has reason to X only if there is some $Y \neq X$ such that A’s X-ing would serve A’s intention to Y. (Relatedly, in this same sense of *reason*, A has reason *against* X-ing only if there is some $Y \neq X$ such that A’s X-ing would interfere with A’s intention to Y.) In the other sense, A may have reason to X even if A has no intention that will be served by her X-ing. (Relatedly, in this same sense of *reason*, A may have reason *against* X-ing even if A has no intention that her X-ing would interfere with.) One can thus distinguish between reasons in the instrumental intention-based sense and reasons in the possibly non-intention-serving sense.⁶ That there are two senses of *reason*, rather than just two sorts of reasons, follows from the (advanced, but as yet unscrutinized) contention that there are two senses of *should*.

A potential adviser will sometimes refuse to provide advice in the instrumental intention-based mode if the action the agent intends to perform is one the potential adviser believes the agent should not, in the possibly non-intention-serving sense, perform. Someone might, for example, respond to “I intend to Y. What should I do?” where this is a request for advice in the instrumental intention-based mode, with something like “Don’t Y, you fool,” where this serves in part as a refusal to answer the question. This refusal is often

part of a more general unwillingness to aid the agent in successfully carrying out her intention. In other circumstances the potential adviser might take the refusal to be inappropriate and either, sincerely or insincerely, answer the question. He might sincerely say, “You should X,” based on his belief that X-ing is a way to Y, a means to Y-ing, or a part of Y-ing, or insincerely (and presumably manipulatively and with the hope of bungling things) say, “You should Z,” based on his belief that Z-ing is *not* a way to Y, a means to Y-ing, or a part of Y-ing. Suppose, for example, that Alison intends to buy tickets to the Celine Dion concert and that Kevin thinks that, in the possibly non-intention-serving sense, she should not do so. If Alison approaches him and says “I want to buy some tickets to the Celine Dion concert. What should I do?” he may refuse to answer her question and respond instead with “Don’t buy tickets to the concert. They’re a big rip-off.” On the other hand, he may think it is pointless to try to talk her out of buying the tickets. (Perhaps he knows how stubborn she is.) Assuming he does not opt for some other way of refusing to answer her question, he can either lie to her or answer her question sincerely. If he tells her that she should get to the ticket vendor an hour before the tickets go on sale, even though he believes that this will be way too late, his advice is insincere. If, however, he tells her she should get to the ticket vendor the day before the tickets go on sale and be prepared to spend the night in line, convinced that this will get her tickets, his advice is sincere. Note that this advice does not conflict with his belief that, in the possibly non-intention-serving sense of *should*, Alison should not go to the ticket vendor the day before the tickets go on sale because she should not go to the concert.

Note that for both advice in the instrumental intention-based mode and advice in the possibly non-intention-serving mode, correct advice need not reflect the advisee’s beliefs, even her reasonable beliefs. Suppose, to re-

cycle an example from Bernard Williams's work,⁷ that an agent intends to have a gin and tonic, and believes (and has reason to believe) that the bottle before her contains gin. Other things equal, "You should pour out an ounce of the liquid from the bottle before you," where this is to be interpreted as advice in the instrumental intention-based mode, will not count as correct advice if the agent's belief is mistaken and the bottle before her contains petrol. Similarly, suppose that an agent has a possibly non-intention-serving reason to relax and enjoy herself for a few hours, and believes (and has reason to believe) that going to her favorite coffee shop would be both relaxing and enjoyable. Other things equal, "You should go to your favorite coffee shop," where this is to be interpreted as advice in the possibly non-intention-serving mode, will not count as correct advice if the agent's belief is mistaken and going to her favorite coffee shop would actually stress and depress the agent because someone she recently had a spat with is there. In short and roughly put, in the relevant senses of "A has reason to X," an agent's reasons are not relative to what the agent believes or to what a reasonable person in the agent's situation would believe, but rather to what is in fact the case.

III.

The distinction between reasons in the instrumental intention-based sense and reasons in the possibly non-intention-serving sense runs contrary to the common supposition that there is only one normative sense of "There is reason for A to X." John Broome, T. M. Scanlon, Christine Korsgaard, and Stephen Darwall all assume that normative-reason-statements of the form "There is reason for A to X" are claims about reasons in a single sense. Scanlon, for example, says that the reasons for action he is concerned with are reasons for action in "the standard, normative sense," (1998, 18); yet he assumes that, even when *wants* is best interpreted as *intends*,

both the statements "Someone who wants to go to Chicago has reason to buy a ticket" and "Someone who would enjoy eating ice cream has reason to do so" are statements about reasons in the standard, normative sense (Scanlon 1998, chap. 1: 19, 41–46).⁸

The assumption that there is only one normative sense of "There is reason for A to X" leads to a serious problem, which can be seen by focusing on certain *conditional normative-should-statements*. Conditional normative-should-statements can be expressed in the form "If _____, A should X," where the consequent, "A should X," is a normative-should-statement. The conditional normative-should-statements that are of particular interest here are those of the form "If A intends to Y, she should X," where X is put forward as a means to Y-ing, a part of Y-ing, or a way to Y. As Darwall recognizes, at least some conditional normative-should-statements of this form, are consistent with corresponding normative-should-statements of the form "A should not Y, and so A should not take means to Y-ing (at least not qua means to Y-ing)," even given the background supposition that A *does* intend to Y and that A's intention is fixed. For example, the conditional normative-should-statement "If Ritsa intends to drive Seth to suicide, she should kill his dog" is consistent with the normative-should-statement "Ritsa should not drive Seth to suicide, and so she should not take means to driving Seth to suicide (at least not qua means to driving Seth to suicide)," even given the background supposition that Ritsa *does* intend to drive Seth to suicide and that her intention is fixed. But given the assumption that the "shoulds" are "shoulds" in the same sense, it is not clear how the statements could both be true.

Note that the fact that the statement "Ritsa should not drive Seth to suicide, and so she should not take means to driving Seth to suicide" is interpretable as a statement concerning Ritsa's moral reasons does not

preclude its being interpretable as a statement concerning Ritsa's normative reasons. Left open here is the question of what the connection is between moral reasons and normative reasons. For all that has been said, Ritsa's decisive normative reasons against driving Seth to suicide may or may not include moral considerations, and whether they include moral considerations may or may not depend on Ritsa's concerns. Whatever the connection between moral reasons and normative reasons, it is possible that while Ritsa intends to drive Seth to suicide, she should (where the sense of *should* in question is a normative sense) not do so, and that Ritsa herself might recognize this. Moreover, if the relatively weak and uncontroversial supposition that moral considerations provide normative reasons for at least some is correct, then it may be that Ritsa is among those for whom moral considerations provide normative reasons and that, though Ritsa believes that she should not drive Seth to suicide (where the sense of *should* in question is a normative sense), she *akratically* decides to do so anyway.

According to Darwall, normative should-statements like "If Ritsa intends to drive Seth to suicide, she should kill his dog" describe "the transfer of reasons" (1983: 16). In such cases, "If A intends to Y, she should X" must be interpreted, according to Darwall, as suggesting that if A *should* Y, then she should X, since "reasons for [one] to make something [one's] end are . . . equally reasons for [one] to take the necessary means to it" (Darwall 1983: 16). Notice that, according to Darwall's proposal, the relevant conditionals cannot be taken at face value, since there is a discrepancy between the straightforward way and the correct way of interpreting the antecedent.⁹ Darwall's suggested interpretation does, however, allow for the consistency of the statements "If Ritsa intends to drive Seth to suicide, she should kill his dog" and "Ritsa should not drive Seth to suicide, and so she should not take means to driving Seth

to suicide (at least not qua means to driving Seth to suicide)," even given the supposition that Ritsa *does* intend to drive Seth to suicide and that her intention is fixed. This is because, according to Darwall's interpretation, the conjunction of the first statement ("If Ritsa intends to drive Seth to suicide, she should kill his dog") and the statement "Ritsa intends to drive Seth to suicide (and her intention is fixed)" does *not* imply that Ritsa should take means to driving Seth to suicide. Notice also that, according to Darwall's proposal, the "shoulds" that have been cast in this paper as "shoulds" in the instrumental intention-based sense are to be interpreted as "shoulds" in the possibly non-intention-serving sense, which is assumed to be the only normative sense of *should* there is.

Though John Broome presents a somewhat different interpretation of the relevant conditionals (which R. Jay Wallace and Jonathan Dancy have adopted¹⁰), his interpretation, like Darwall's transfer-of-reasons interpretation, makes the consequents non-detachable.¹¹ (More precisely, according to both Darwall and Broome, the conjunction of a conditional of the relevant sort and its antecedent taken at face value, does not imply the consequent of the conditional.) Like Darwall, Broome is committed to the view that instrumental reasoning could never lead to any conclusions of the form "A should X" except via patterns of reasoning in which reasons for taking the means are derived from reasons for having the end, as in patterns like

A should Y.

The only way for A to Y is for A to X.

Therefore, A should X.¹²

Korsgaard is also clearly convinced of this. She says that "unless there are normative principles directing us to the adoption of certain ends, there can be no requirement to take the means to our ends," since reason can require us to take the means to our ends only if the ends are "not merely ones that we

happen to have in view, but ones that we have some reason to keep in view” (Korsgaard 1997: 220, 252). According to Korsgaard, properly understood, the principle behind the single correct form of instrumental reasoning is “if you *have a reason to pursue* an end, then you have a reason to take the means to that end” (1997: 245). She thus concludes that instrumental reason “cannot stand alone” (1997: 251).¹³

IV.

This section provides arguments against both Darwall’s interpretation and Broome’s interpretation of the statements that have been cast in this paper as conditional should-statements in the instrumental intention-based mode. Since these are the going interpretations, attention will be restricted to them.¹⁴ Recall that, according to Darwall’s transfer-of-reasons interpretation, “If A intends to Y, she should X” is to be interpreted as “If A *should* Y, then she should X.” The unacceptability of this interpretation can be illustrated via an example in which the speaker is willing to assert the consequent of a conditional normative-should-statement of the form “If A intends to Y, she should X” in which X is part of Y-ing, a means to Y-ing, or a way to Y, though she would not be willing to affirm the reasonableness of the agent’s intention. Recall the initial example of practical deliberation provided, in which Bri has been invited to a party, concludes that she should stay home, decides to go anyway, and then draws the further conclusion that she should go get some bus tickets before the station closes. In this case, Bri is willing to assert the consequent of the conditional normative-should-statement “If I intend to go to the party, I should go get some bus tickets before the station closes” and conduct herself accordingly, even though she believes that her intention to go to the party is *unreasonable*. It is thus clear that the conditional cannot be interpreted as “If I should go to the party, then I should go to get some bus tickets before the station closes.” Note that Bri’s state-

ment “I should go get some bus tickets before the station closes” cannot be interpreted as the result of her *pretending* that her intention is reasonable (or else treating her intention as reasonable in some other way), since if this was what was going on, Bri would also be willing to assert (carrying on the pretense) that she should go to the party; but, at least in the typical case, Bri would not be willing to assert this. As was suggested when the example was first offered, it is significant that once Bri forms the intention to go to the party, she arrives at the conclusion that she should go get some bus tickets before the station closes without proceeding via the statement that she should go to the party. Darwall’s transfer-of-reasons interpretation must, therefore, be dismissed.

Consider next Broome’s interpretation of the statements that have been cast in this paper as conditional should-statements in the instrumental intention-based mode. Like Darwall, Broome is led by his assumption that there is only one normative sense of *should*—namely *should* in the possibly non-intention-serving sense—to propose and defend an interpretation of the relevant conditionals according to which the consequents are non-detachable. Broome’s view is that statements like “If Bri intends to go to the party, she should get some bus tickets before the station closes” are, strictly speaking, defective because the scope of the modality is really the entire conditional rather than the consequent. What is really meant, according to Broome, can be more accurately represented as follows: “Bri should (in the possibly non-intention-serving sense) see to it that [if she intends to go to the party, then she gets some bus tickets before the station closes].” Unlike Darwall, Broome addresses the fact (emphasized in the previous section) that people tend, in reasoning, to detach the consequents of the relevant conditionals. In response, Broome acknowledges that his view implies that, not only the relevant conditionals, but also the tendency to detach the consequents of such conditionals cannot be taken at face value; he

attempts, however, to show that a special feature of his interpretation makes this an acceptable implication.

This attempt need not be considered, since Broome's interpretation suffers from another serious problem. The problem, which Broome does not see, is that his interpretation makes a whole class of statements that he recognizes as (given the right circumstances) uncontroversially true—such as the statement “Ritsa should see to it that [if she intends to drive Seth to suicide, then she kills his dog]”—come off seeming false. To take a concrete example, suppose that Ritsa should (in the possibly non-intention-serving sense) see to it that she does not drive Seth to suicide, and that Ritsa recognizes this but *akratically* decides to drive Seth to suicide anyway. Then the statement “Ritsa should *in the possibly non-intention-serving sense* see to it that [if she intends to drive Seth to suicide, then she kills his dog (qua means to driving Seth to suicide)]” is implausible. For, if this statement were true, then the following statement would also be true: “Ritsa should *in the possibly non-intention-serving sense* see to it that [if she intends to drive Seth to suicide, then she does not sabotage her own efforts at carrying out her fixed intention].” But this statement seems false. Indeed, given that, by hypothesis, Ritsa's possibly non-intention-serving reasons favor her not driving Seth to suicide, it seems safe to say that of the following two situations, the first is more favorable *from the point of view of Ritsa's possibly non-intention-serving reasons* than the second: (i) Ritsa intends to drive Seth to suicide, but, having failed to in some way see to it that she does not sabotage things, she sabotages her own efforts at carrying out her fixed intention; (ii) Ritsa intends to drive Seth to suicide, and, having organized things in such a way that precludes her sabotaging things, she does not sabotage her own efforts at carrying out her fixed intention. (Of course, the fact that the first situation is more

favorable than the second *from the point of view of Ritsa's possibly non-intention-serving reasons* does not imply that the first situation is more favorable than the second from the point of view of Ritsa's *instrumental intention-based reasons*.)

It might be noticed that because of the nature of intending, it does not make sense to say “Ritsa should see to it that [if she intends to drive Seth to suicide, then she sabotages her own efforts at carrying out her fixed intention]” even though it is possible for Ritsa to intend to drive Seth to suicide while at the same time sabotaging her own efforts at carrying out her fixed intention. With this in mind, it might be objected that it cannot be that the statement “Ritsa should (in the possibly non-intention-serving sense) see to it that [if she intends to drive Seth to suicide, then she sabotages her own efforts at carrying out her fixed intention]” is true, and so it cannot be that this statement (henceforth R1) is more plausible than the statement “Ritsa should (in the possibly non-intention-serving sense) see to it that [if she intends to drive Seth to suicide, then she does *not* sabotage her own efforts at carrying out her fixed intention]” (henceforth R2). This is quite right, except for the suggestion that this serves as an objection to the argument provided in the preceding paragraph. To say that the first situation described above is more favorable from the point of view of Ritsa's possibly non-intention-serving reasons than the second is not to say that R1 rather than R2 is true. Both statements (R1 and R2) are false. The first because of the nature of intending, and the second because it is false that Ritsa should (in the possibly non-intention-serving sense) see to it that a situation that is less favorable than possible (in terms of her possibly non-intention-serving reasons) obtains. The fact that Ritsa cannot see to it that the more favorable situation obtains is no indication that she has reason (in the possibly non-intention-serving sense) to see to it that it does not obtain.

It might also be noticed that, in the first situation described above, it is a fumble of a

certain sort that saves Ritsa from taking an action that she should not (in the possibly non-intention-serving sense) take. With this in mind, it might be suggested that the fact that the first situation contains a fumble is reason to suppose that the second situation is more favorable from the point of view of Ritsa's possibly non-intention-serving reasons. But the mere fact that the first situation contains a fumble is not necessarily a negative thing relative to the agent's possibly non-intention-serving reasons. For a fumble may, from the point of view of an agent's possibly non-intention-serving reasons, be favorable. This becomes more apparent if one recalls Williams's gin/petrol case in which an agent intends to have a gin and tonic, believes that the bottle before her contains gin, but is mistaken—the bottle contains petrol. If Williams's gin-lover does not pour herself a drink from the bottle containing petrol due to some fumble (which may or may not involve sabotage on the part of the agent), then the fumble would be favorable from the point of view of the gin-lover's possibly non-intention-serving reasons, simply because the gin-lover should not (in the possibly non-intention-serving sense) pour herself a drink from the bottle containing petrol.

Finally, it might be objected that the idea that one can both intend to X while also sabotaging one's intention to X is suspicious. This objection seems weak, but, in any case, the following more direct argument against the plausibility of the statement "Ritsa should *in the possibly non-intention-serving sense* see to it that [if she intends to drive Seth to suicide, then she kills his dog]" is available and convincing once it is clearly recognized that a fumble may, from the point of view of an agent's possibly non-intention-serving reasons, be favorable: Given that, by hypothesis, Ritsa's possibly non-intention-serving reasons favor her not driving Seth to suicide, it seems safe to say that of the following two situations, the first is more favorable *from*

the point of view of Ritsa's possibly non-intention-serving reasons than the second: (i) Ritsa intends to drive Seth to suicide, but, having failed to bring the right key, she does not kill Seth's dog when the opportunity to do so arises; (ii) Ritsa intends to drive Seth to suicide, and, having brought the right key, she kills Seth's dog when the opportunity to do so arises (and thereby drives Seth to suicide). In the first situation, Ritsa herself, even while scolding herself for her carelessness, could nonetheless recognize that, from the point of view of her possibly non-intention-serving reasons, things have worked out well (at least for the moment).

It seems safe to conclude that, interpreted as concerning the agent's possibly non-intention-serving reasons, a statement of the form "A should see to it that [if she intends to Z, then she Y-s (qua means to Z-ing)]" is implausible given the supposition that A should (in the possibly non-intention-serving sense) see to it that she does not Z. It follows that Broome's interpretation of the relevant conditionals, which casts the statements as possibly non-intention-serving should-statements in which the scope of the modality is, when properly represented, the entire conditional, not only prohibits us from taking such statements, and a related tendency, at face value; it also fails to allow for the consistency of such a statement, which Broome would have us represent in the form "A should see to it that [if she intends to Z, then she Y-s (qua means to Z-ing)]," with a corresponding statement of the form "A should not Z, and so A should not take the means to Z-ing (at least not qua means)." More precisely, it fails to allow for the consistency of such pairs of statements when A intends to Z and her intention is fixed. And yet, allowing for this is the point behind the enterprise of finding an interpretation of the relevant conditionals that implies non-detachability.

V.

Given what is common ground, namely that some should-statements are properly interpreted as should-statements in the possibly non-intention-serving mode,¹⁵ and given the inadequacy of the going interpretations of the statements that have been cast in this paper as conditional should-statements in the instrumental intention-based mode, it is reasonable to hold that there are two normative senses of “A should X” and two corresponding senses of “There is reason for A to X.” The two corresponding senses of “There is reason for A to X” both concern normative reasons, where these are, by definition, considerations that ground correct conclusions of practical deliberation and correct advice. It follows that two pragmatically conflicting pieces of advice may be consistent in that they may both be correct. (Recall that the relevant sense of *advice* here is the narrow sense picked out in section I, according to which there is a necessary connection between practical deliberation and advice.) So reason may require both that an agent Z and that she not-Z (where neither requirement is relative to the agent’s beliefs or to what a reasonable person would believe; instead, both requirements are relative to what is in fact the case). In such situations, Z-ing will get the agent both a check mark and an ex from reason, as will not-Z-ing—reason will not be able to speak with one voice about whether the agent is to Z.

The reasoning that has figured in this paper so far has taken for granted the common identification of normative reasons with considerations that ground correct conclusions of practical deliberation and correct advice. But perhaps there is reason to challenge this identification. More specifically, perhaps there is reason to reserve the term *normative reasons* for possibly non-intention-serving reasons. Maybe possibly non-intention-serving reasons are more interesting or important, at least

philosophically, than instrumental intention-based reasons, and maybe the term *normative reasons* is meant to be, or at least should be, reserved for this especially interesting or important sense of *reasons*. Or maybe a consideration (such as the consideration that killing Seth’s dog would drive Seth to suicide) can ground a correct conclusion of practical deliberation and correct advice (such as the conclusion “I [Ritsa] should kill Seth’s dog”) without being a reason because there is some feature that reasons are thought of as having that some grounding considerations, namely the considerations referred to as instrumental intention-based reasons, lack.

Here the thing to say is that this alternative use of *normative reasons* will not allow philosophers like Darwall, Korsgaard, and Broome to hang onto their central and highly influential idea that instrumental reasoning cannot lead from an intention to a correct practical conclusion of the form “A should X” unless reason directs A to the adoption of the intention. For, as was argued above, there are cases, like Bri’s, in which an agent reasons instrumentally to a practical conclusion (of the form “I should X”) from an *akratic* intention. This remains true regardless of whether or not one decides to apply the label “normative reasons” to the considerations that ground such conclusions of practical deliberation. Relatedly, the proposed alternative use of *normative reasons* will not allow Darwall, Korsgaard, and Broome to hang onto the idea that they have hit upon a devastating objection to the Humean view that practical reasoning is essentially instrumental reasoning because there are no rationally required ends. In short, while conforming to the alternative use of *normative reasons* would require a restatement of some of the points made above, it would not alter the impact of the above arguments on the debate concerning the role of instrumental reasoning in practical deliberation. This will become even more apparent in the next and final section.

VI.

It follows from the distinction between *should* in the instrumental intention-based sense and *should* in the possibly non-intention-serving sense that the answer to the question “Can instrumental reason stand alone?” is “yes and no.” To see this, notice that there are two types of instrumental reasoning that count as practical reasoning. On the one hand, there is possibly non-intention-serving instrumental reasoning, which in simple cases (in which the means is a necessary means) is of the form

A should Y.

The only way for A to Y is for A to X.

Therefore, A should X.

On the other hand, there is instrumental intention-based reasoning, which in simple cases (in which the means is a necessary means) is of the form

A intends to Y.

The only way for A to Y is for A to X.

Therefore, A should X.

While possibly non-intention-serving instrumental reasoning must build on a rationally required end, instrumental intention-based reasoning need not, and so the latter can stand alone. There is, then, room for the Humean position that some have attempted to rule out as confused,¹⁶ namely that practical reasoning is essentially instrumental reasoning because there are no rationally required ends (not even agent-centered ones such as “Look out for yourself” or “Heed your passions”). This Humean position can be interpreted as accepting the existence of reasons in the instrumental intention-based sense, but denying the existence of reasons in the possibly non-intention-serving sense—a perfectly coherent stance.

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NOTES

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1. See in particular Broome 1999 and 1997, Scanlon 1998, Korsgaard 1997, and Darwall 1983.
2. This position is related to Bernard Williams’s distinction, in Williams 1979, between internal and external reasons. How Williams’s distinction is related to the distinction that will be drawn in this paper is a complicated matter that is taken up in “Remodeling Internal Reasons” (Andreou, unpublished manuscript).
3. See, for example, Korsgaard 1997. Based on the contention that instrumental reason cannot stand alone, she argues that the Humean can be forced to flee her position, either to nihilism or to an acceptance of non-instrumental reasons.

4. Note that given the context of this paper, the arguments provided will focus on supporting the claim that there are *at least* two normative senses of “There is reason for A to X,” rather than the claim that there are *no more than* two normative senses of “There is reason for A to X.”

5. This odd view differs dramatically from the plausible view that unless one has significant grounds for reconsideration (as, for example, if one finds things completely different than one expected they would be), one has pragmatic reason to act on intentions arrived at via (and in accordance with the conclusions of) one’s prior practical deliberation. For interesting discussion of this plausible view see Bratman 1999.

6. Notice that instrumental intention-based reasoning does not involve bootstrapping. Bootstrapping might be involved if it were supposed that an intention to Y could give one reason to Y. But what is supposed is that an intention to Y could give one reason to X (\neq Y), where X-ing is a means to Y-ing. Such a reason would, of course, be an instrumental intention-based reason, not a possibly non-intention-serving reason.

7. See Williams 1979: 18.

8. According to Scanlon, when someone who intends to go to Chicago has reason to buy a ticket, it is not because her intention is the original source of the reason, but because her intention is prompted by her identification of the independently-existing reason (1998: 45).

9. Darwall does not discuss this feature of his proposal. He claims that the relevant conditionals counsel us “*either* to take the means *or* to give up the end” (Darwall 1983: 16), without noting that there is at least an apparent discrepancy between “If A intends to Y, she should X” and “Either A should X or she should refrain from Y-ing.” (What follows from the latter statement is “If A should Y, she should X.”)

10. See Wallace 2001 and Dancy 2000.

11. See Broome 1999.

12. See Broome 1997, section II.

13. A few years before Korsgaard’s argument appeared, Warren Quinn had tucked the same idea into a reply to an objection to his interpretation of the “neo-Humean theory of rationalization.” See (Quinn 1993: 237–238). As Quinn seemed to recognize, (see footnote 21 in his paper) there was a great deal more that needed to be said. Fortunately the idea has since been brought to center stage.

Donald C. Hubin, though he is a self-proclaimed Humean, agrees with Korsgaard that instrumental reason cannot stand alone. He thus grants that, to be defensible, the Humean position must be interpreted as going beyond simple instrumentalism (Hubin 2001: 459). If the reasoning in this paper is on the right track, then Hubin is conceding too much to Korsgaard.

14. Though it is tempting to construct and then criticize additional possible interpretations that might be taken up by defenders of the view that the possibly non-intention-serving sense of *should* is the only normative sense of *should*, this temptation will be resisted, both for the sake of compactness and because it is likely that Darwall and Broome have already thought of and recognized the inadequacies of the additional possible interpretations that suggest themselves.

15. Note that this view is consistent with the possibility that there aren’t actually any reasons in the possibly non-intention-serving sense and so such should-statements are defective. There is more discussion concerning this possibility in the final section of this paper.

16. See especially Korsgaard 1997.

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